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2PREFACE
Home is where your heart is
Plinius Senior
New self-government has been around for a dozen of years. This period, of course, is too short to
make any conclusions about the failure or success of this undertaking: the institution itself is too
complex, its introduction affects deep layers of Russian society, its significance goes way beyond
pure administration. However, one is tempted to look back and draw certain conclusions, and this
seems quite reasonable. Many can probably remember the high hopes associated with local self-
government in the first years of Russian independence. It seemed that as soon as the state gates
would open, the vast space of political life would be flooded with liberated activity of the people,
who have been suffering under the strict and petty guardianship of the state for many decades To
this day, even Russian high-ranking officials never fail to include in their public speeches and
documents some solemn words about local self-governance being, first and foremost, the school of
civil society, where a “newborn” citizen should learn how to live by his own mind, build his
community life on his own and provide for his daily needs without looking back at the government.
The necessity of participation in the life of society, as well as the fruits of his labor in the public
field, is especially evident at the place that the citizen calls home. There the citizen knows his
compatriots personally and is known to them, therefore public relationships built at this level are
more natural and fundamental. All these facts give rise to hopes that local self-governance can
liberate the latent forces of civil society, which cannot be mobilized so easily by the state or in the
name of general national goals, as the chain of cause-and-effect links between such goals and a
certain citizen is quite often too long for a citizen to realize his direct interest in achieving such
distant goals. At the local level, on the contrary, this chain is very short, goals are clear and, most
importantly, they are formulated by the citizens directly and not through some “envoys”, like State
Duma deputies, or “appointees” like state officials. The ancient were right saying that home is
where your heart is, and the heart is the organ capable of multiplying many times the forces that can
be mobilized by the brain.
Alas, ten years were enough to realize that “the school of civil society” did not happen, at least for
now. Instead, we got a kind of channel for re-distribution of federal budget funds to schools,
hospitals and utility sector, and the rules of this re-distribution are determined at the very top, while
local self-governments don’t have even the slightest chance to influence these rules. We also got a
new type of elections for electing those who were assigned with the task of re-distributing the state
funds and thus serving as transmitters of state decisions.
Moreover, not only the number of municipalities did not increase, but it was going down fast and
during the period from 1994 to 2002 fell down almost three times – from 30 thousand to 11.5
thousand. Even worse than that were the principles of municipal formation: the area principle
prevailed over the settlement principle. In accordance to the former, the right to self-governance
was given not to residents of a certain settlement, clearly associated with notion of “home” in
people’s minds, but to vast territories of administrative raions. Till this day, about half of our cities
have no self-government, but almost three quarters of administrative raions (non-urban) have the
self-government status and therefore constitute the majority of our so-called municipalities.
But even worse was the indifference of the citizens to the new institution. Municipal elections did
not raise any enthusiasm, the attendance was extremely poor and often below the required
minimum, thus making the elections void. Local self-government seemed as something alien to the
3life of society, and the number of those, who did not see any sense in supporting it somewhat
artificially, was growing, in particular – among federal officials.
It is not surprising that during the first “Putin’s” years, when a certain revision of the legislative
legacy of the Eltsin’s period was undertaken, the fate of local self-government was also discussed.
In order to revise the existing federal relationships, a presidential committee was formed, headed by
an influential leader (D.Kozak), and among many tasks of the committee, one of the most important
was to develop a new law on local self-governance.
This law was developed in a manner, unique for the new Russian state: draft after draft were
produced by the committee and submitted for public discussion. However, the final draft was not
very different from the first one, as if there was no public debate. A lot has been written about
defects and flaws of the draft law.  Two more points, however, are still worth mentioning, as they
are rarely discussed: the work of the committee was not preceded by any detailed analysis of the
cause of the current crisis of local self-governance, nor was it accompanied by any estimates of
possible practical implications, not to mention “field” experiments.
This report attempts to provide one of the missing links of this work – cause analysis. There are a
lot of different opinions on this subject. Among possible causes, the following are named: Russians
are unprepared to participate in local self-governance and have no trust in democratic institutions in
general; governors almost everywhere are at war with mayors of large cities, viewing them as their
contenders; “evil actions” of the Ministry of Finance, which would prefer to have municipalities on
a fixed budget, and many other reasons, including the fact that the very concept of federalism is
unacceptable for the new presidential administration, key figures of which have emerged from
institutions with strict hierarchy and the much-talked-about “vertical line of authority”, the
enforcement of which President Putin is so often charged with.
This report is aimed at demonstrating the following: the main fundamental cause of the crisis was
the system of municipal finance imposed on local self-governments by federal authorities. This is
the root of all problems of Russian municipal process, this is what blocks its normal development.
Deprived of almost any autonomy in the use of funds, constantly baffled by endless change of rules
introduced by the federal government, powerless and debt-ridden – such self-government simply
could not be of any interest to the citizen, who was supposed to find in it the arena for public
activity. The indifference of Russian citizens to “new” self-governance was a rational reaction to its
powerlessness and uselessness, and therefore should not be viewed as a sign of some inherent anti-
democratic value  within Russian culture. The population viewed local self-governance as a
respectable institution when it functioned as a transmission channel for state funds allocated for
culture, education and healthcare, but as far as its role as the school of civil society (at least, a
primary school), it seemed to be a pure formality, i.e. not any better than official federalism in
soviet times. Mired by the state (whether with or without intent), local self-governance lost its
appeal in the eyes of the general public, and the question now is: has the appeal of local self-
governance perished for good, or are there still any possibilities for its revival?
The author of the report does not attempt to accuse the authorities of any evil intent or a secret
desire to discredit the very idea of local non-governmental autonomy of the society; he is not trying
to say that this autonomy, being a slogan of any democratic revolution, is always proclaimed at
times of political recovery, but later can be minimized by imposing certain restrictions on local self-
governments. In the author’s opinion, the authorities did not have such an intent. They just
disregarded these issues in the first years of Russian independence, when these issues seemed less
important than the dangers, which threatened the very existence of the newborn state. Actually, all
necessary declarations on the subject have been made, and it is worth mentioning that the law on
budget autonomy of local self-governments is older than the Constitution, as it was adopted on
April 15, 1993. However, the ideas proclaimed in it were not implemented properly.
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budget and finance. The heaviest one – is bringing municipal autonomy to the lowest possible level.
The report demonstrates that in the past ten years the level of municipal autonomy not only has not
increased, as the logic of self-governance development would suggest, but has fallen considerably.
Today, municipalities are able to fully control only about 4 – 5% of their revenues, the rest being
strictly regulated by federal rules. As the author shows, in the USA the autonomous share is about
two thirds, in Canada – about the same, and in Europe it is sometimes over three quarters. This
provides clear evidence to the fact that in these countries “independent activity of citizens, on their
own responsibility”, mentioned in Article 2 of our federal law “On the General Principles of the
Organization of Local Self-Governance” is already in place.
In order to ensure a better understanding of local autonomy, let’s consider an example from a
“classic” country of federalism – the USA. There are a variety  of local self-government
organizational structures,  whose authority  depends on the laws of each state and  by a special
charter (so called, home rule). However, in almost every . Typical  local government, city officials
ask the citizens to identify their priorities  when budgeting  for the next year  through a variety of
citizen participation means such as referenda, public hearings, focus groups, citizen surveys, and
the like.
Now, let’s consider the following question: is it possible to even imagine something similar in the
situation that Russian municipalities find themselves in today?
The question, of course, is a rhetorical one. Instead of answering it, let’s cite an example provided
by the leader of one of the volosts of Leningrad Oblast. The population of the volost is about 8
thousand, there are approximately 3 thousand of households, mostly private. For years residents
used to throw out garbage just outside their gates and by last summer they could not tolerate dirty
streets and neighborhoods any longer. Volost authorities decided to organize centralized garbage
collection and turned to OOO Kolpinskii Spetsavtotrans – a large specialized company. The
company agreed to undertake this task on condition that each household would have a garbage
container. The volost had to purchase these containers, spending about RUR 60 thousand from the
budget, allocated to it by the raion, which had a self-government status. However, current expenses
in the amount of approximately RUR 46 thousand a year were too big for the volosts’ meager
budget. Residents’ gatherings were called, on which they agreed that the volost would collect a fee
of about RUR 60 per year from each of them. However, this fee was clandestine, so to speak: if the
public prosecutor would learn about it, no only would he prohibit this self-imposed taxation, but
also would impose a severe penalty on the volost administration. This is not just a guess: when
Gatchinsky Raion tried to do something similar openly, public prosecutor banned this initiative
immediately. Needless to say that self-government which is not entitled to decide independently
even on such a simple issue as garbage collection, cannot inspire much respect in the citizens.
The second blow – probably, more important for practice than the first one – is steady reduction of
the share of local budgets in the total budget of the country. As shown in the report, during the last
ten years, the municipal share of consolidated budget expenses was reduced approximately by one
third. If this share is calculated on the basis of GDP (real expenses), according to the author’s
calculations, in the period from 1997 to 2002 it was reduced from 10.9% to 6.5% for local budgets,
while for regional budgets it has grown from 6.6% to 8.3%, and for federal budget it has grown
even more – from 10.8% to 16.6%. During the last 2-3 years, i.e. during the “Putin’s” epoch, the
reduction was especially drastic, which clearly indicates the attitude of federal authorities to local
self-governance.
The new draft law reinforces this tendency: according to calculations of the Ministry of Finance,
cited during a round table discussion at the Federation Council on March 13, 2003, as a result of the
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the same, while about RUR 200 – 250 billion will be moved from municipal expense items to the
expenses of the subjects of the Russian Federation. According to the Ministry of Finance, today
expenses of municipal budgets and those of the subjects of the Russian Federation are
approximately the same (a little bit over RUR 1 trillion a year), while after the adoption of the draft
law, municipal expenses will go down to RUR 800 billion, and regional expenses will grow to RUR
1.3 trillion, i.e. will be 1.5 times greater than the municipal ones. This means that we have a real
budgetary revolution ahead of us, which will take the form of sharp reduction of the role of
municipal budgets in governing the country.
Obviously, such reduction can be justified (at least in part) by reduction of the notorious mandates,
i.e. state orders, not covered by financing, however the scale of reduction has exceeded these limits
by far. Municipalities are losing more and more of their functions. This usually serves as
justification for the reduction of municipal budgets: i.e. why do they need so much funding, if their
powers and responsibilities are gradually being reduced? This reduction process has been going on
for several years now, which can be proved by the following calculations of the author, made for all
subfederal budgets of the country except Moscow and St. Petersburg. If we assume total expenses
of these budgets as 100%, it turns out, that in the period from 1996 to 2001, the municipal share of
expenses for social policy has fallen from 70% to 48%, for healthcare – from 74% to 63%, for
culture – from 71% to 66%, for education – from 88% to 82%, and only the share of expenses for
housing and utility sector - the most difficult and controversial portion of expenses - has increased
somewhat: from 85% to 88%. Thus, even such traditional local issues as schools, hospitals, clubs,
sports facilities and social assistance are being gradually moved "to the top".
This transfer of responsibilities (and financing) contradicts the  subsidiary principles, pursuant to
which the largest possible number of functions should be performed at the local level, and only
those functions, which evidently cannot be performed at the local level, should be transferred to the
higher levels. In short, there is a certain optimal volume of local powers, reduction of which looks
like an attempt upon the very essence of the institution of local self-governance. International
practice suggests that a "reasonable" distribution of budget funds between the three levels of power
(federal, regional and local) should fluctuate around the following ratio: 50:25:25%. In Russia, the
third component of this ratio is already below the optimal value and continues to go down.
Reduction of local budget capacity below 25%, at the very least, indicates the tendency in this
direction.
The third blow is presented by constant changes in federal rules concerning the local budgets. It
will suffice to mention only the constant growth of tariffs for services of natural monopolies (RAO
UES and Gazprom, first of all) provided to municipalities. Such tariff increases, occurring several
times in the course of a financial year, were destabilizing local budget economy; under such
conditions it was pointless for local authorities not only to plan their modest expense policy but
even to adopt the budget as a normative act. One of the most recent and drastic examples is the
federal decision to increase sharply the wages of budget-financed employees, made in December
2001. It was planned to provide the appropriate amount of subsidies to local budgets for this
purpose, however, high-ranking federal officials were constantly pointing out that local budgets,
allegedly, spend too much money on such things as "Palaces of Sport" and other "luxury items",
which means that they have enough of their own funds to finance the wage increase. Subsequently,
in reality everything came down to a typical mandate, i.e. local budgets were forced to bear
expenses pursuant to federal decision.
Widespread practice of mandates was another, extremely painful blow to the local budgets. This
practice eliminated the very hope for a balanced budget. In 2001, the author surveyed the leaders of
622 municipalities of the Volga Federal District. According to them, their budget revenues need to
be increased 1.5 times in order to be able to fulfill all the mandates.
All these problems of municipal finance, especially the lack of stability and balance, drove away all
potential creditors, which proved to be a one more blow to local self-government. Municipal
authorities themselves, deprived of any trust in the credit market, tried to avoid borrowing. Only the
biggest cities in the country presented an exception from this rule, but even they had a rather
conservative borrowing policy (Moscow should not be considered at all in this respect, as
politicized and omnipotent leaders of the city were solving their budget problems by methods, not
typical for local self-governments, to say the least). The issue of external financing is covered in a
separate chapter of the report, where the issues of budget debt and budget deficit financing by local
budgets are examined in detail.
Russian practice contains a lot of examples of municipalities producing impressive results even
under the present difficult conditions. In such cases, municipal administrations are highly respected
by the residents, who give due credit to the municipal leaders during elections, as they have been
convinced of the usefulness of local self-governance and its ability to meet their daily needs, unlike
regional or federal authorities. It is true that such examples are usually presented by the cities with
high budget capacity (e.g. Surgut, Nefteiugansk), however their success should actually be
attributed to skillful management of the funds, as there are also examples of Russian cities spending
considerable budgets rather inefficiently (e.g. Moscow). In Russia, a whole formation of skilled
municipal workers has already appeared, who have learned to find possibilities for independent
financial activity in spite of strict state control. Unfortunately, many of their skills are used to
circumvent the absurd legislative boundaries set by federal authorities, which puts municipal
management in some kind of "semi-underground" position (although, not unusual for those, who
worked at the local level in soviet times). This produces an illusion of civil society - of life outside
of state instructions, organized by the citizens of their own will. But this is a bad civil society,
which teaches the citizen to avoid the law and any contact with the state and leads the country into
an unhealthy path of development. The task is to establish a system of state regulation, under which
municipal managers could use their capacities to the benefit of the citizens and do so legally.
Unfortunately, there is still a long way to that goal.  Meager and melting away, unbalanced and
overburdened by mandates, cut off from the credit market and from real settlements, the municipal
budgets have become a real stumbling stone on the way of local self-governance development in
Russia. Their powerlessness discredits the very idea of local autonomy of society in the eyes of the
citizens, who do not yet have enough democratic experience to make their judgment about this
autonomy, notwithstanding the current circumstances. The new draft law, unfortunately, provides
only for some particular changes, but reinforces once again the existing wrong interpretation of
local self-governance. The report attempts to demonstrate that the whole system of local budget and
finance is evolving in the wrong direction and the defects of this system are growing and becoming
more aggravated.
However, the feeling of concern, produced by the report, should not turn into the feeling of
hopelessness and lead to the conclusion that local self-governance in Russia has already perished.
On the contrary, the key idea of the report is just the opposite: the cause of local self-governance
crisis in our country lies not in the fact that the people are not ready to accept it, but in the defective
mechanism of local budget and finance, which was imposed on local self-governments by the state.
As soon as this system is changed in principle and the mechanisms tested successfully in many
countries are introduced, development of local self-governance will quickly take a turn for the
better. Then, the citizens will be convinced of the direct usefulness of local self-governance for
their daily life, as well as of the direct accessibility of this institution to their personal influence,
and therefore will be willing to participate in it.
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stable, slow quantitative growth is evident (whatever the reasons, it's still better than the regress of
the 1990-s). The adoption of such documents as the Land Code, Federal Special Purpose Program
"Zhilische", Program of Budget Federalism Development, helped to improve the municipal
management. Finally, the ever-growing attention of the public to the institution of self-governance
takes many new forms, such as budget hearings, public chambers, competitions of projects of
public significance, etc. Thus, even in the current situation, local self-governance proves its
viability, which enables us to say with confidence: reasonable financing and freedom of
independent activity can lead local self-governance into the path of success.
INTRODUCTION
This report reviews Russian municipal fiscal autonomy reforms over the last decade.
It is based on statistics provided by the Russian Federation Finance Ministry for the performance of
consolidated budgets in the Russian Federation from 1996-2001 as well as on budget reporting data
covering the same period provided by selected Federation constituents and municipalities. In
addition, data from budget-execution reports from 79 Russian cities1 for the period from 1999 to
2001 were used.
The report is structured into an introduction and five chapters. Chapter 1 describes general
approaches to evaluation of decentralization and fiscal autonomy processes. Chapter 2 studies
municipal revenues while spending responsibilities and expenditure budgets are analyzed in
Chapter 3. Chapter 4 focuses on municipal borrowing and deficit practices. Chapter 5 presents the
results of calculations for budgetary implications of the enactment of draft law “On the general
principles of the organization of local self governance in the Russian federation”.
The main conclusions contained within this report are:
- The fiscal autonomy of municipalities steadily decreased during the study period.
- Over the five last years (1996-2001), revenues of Russian municipalities dropped by 26
percent. In the last three years, the proportion of local taxes in municipal revenue
budgets shrank significantly.
- The post-crisis period was a period of deterioration of the vertical fiscal balance at the
regional level. The proportion of regional transfers in the structure of local revenue
budgets increased.
- Continuous revision to the federal tax law during the last decade was very destructive to
local government revenue stability causing significant difficulties in financial
management, long-term (more than 1 year) borrowing, and implementation of large
investment projects.
- Expenditure budgets of municipalities continue to be almost fully regulated by federal
laws limiting local autonomy in determining the volume and structure of public services
to be provided.
- The upward trend in the housing sector costs of municipalities was reversed due to the
housing sector reform progress.
- Regional governments continued to increasingly finance municipal educational and
social costs because of the weakened fiscal autonomy of local governments.
                                               
1 The city statistics database was provided by the Institute for Transition Economics
8- The strength of the budget determines the economic structure spending from the city
budget.
- The example of the regions of the Volga Federal District shows that the improvement of
the budget strength of subjects of the Russian Federation does not result in the shift in
the financing of the consolidated budget's social sector spending items to regional
budgets. On the contrary, there is a trend towards centralization of spending on the
housing and utility sector in richer regions.
- Borrowing policies and practices of municipalities remain undeveloped. Budget loans
and short-term bank loans to cover cash gaps remain the main forms of municipal
borrowing. There is little evidence of the use of long-term debt to finance capital
investment projects.
The municipal finance reform as well as the general process of reforming in Russia has a more than
ten years history. For municipalities these reforms imply the need to review their revenue and
expenditure policies, further develop their budget planning methods and form such financial
departments in municipalities that will be capable to respond to challenges set by the federal and
regional governments.
91. DECENTRALIZATION OF THE BUDGET SYSTEM AND FISCAL
AUTONOMY OF MUNICIPALITIES IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
1.1. PHASING IN OF REFORMS
Decentralization of the budget system and fiscal autonomy of municipalities in the Russian
Federation Reform may be divided into the following phases.
The first phase (1990 – 1993) witnessed the formation of major governmental institutions of the
Russian Federation (RF) and closed with the enactment of the RF Constitution. Principles of local
self-governance were set forth in Chapter 8 of the Constitution.2 As for regulation of fiscal issues,
Article 132 reads “local self-governments have autonomy in municipal property management,
planning, authorization and administration of local budgets, regulation and collection of local taxes
and fees, etc”. The Article also allows for “delegating specific state (federal) mandates to local self-
governments with simultaneous provision of them with appropriate material and financial
resources”. While local government was mandated to provide certain services, the necessary
financial resources to meet these mandates were not provided contrary to the provisions of the
Article.
This stage resulted in establishing local self governments as bodies operating apart from the system
of state authorities.
A legitimate issue at this time was whether local governments would have an adequate revenue
base to meet their needs. The reformers anticipated the problems local governments would meet
when fulfilling their tax collection rights and expenditure responsibilities, but other priorities left no
time for them to address these problems. Noted later in this report, the federal level did not design a
financial concept for municipalities until the later 1990s.
The second phase of municipal finance reform was 1993-1994 when, in 1994, the federal
government established a single system for sharing federal taxes between regions. This decision
resulted in substantial modification of the regional revenue collection system making it more
predictable than it had previously been. Accordingly, the local government revenue collection
system also became more predictable.
The third phase, from 1995 to 1998, was a period when laws On Local Self-Governance and On
Financial Autonomy of Local Self-Governments were adopted. The latter set definite rates for
sharing federal taxes with local governments and thus made municipal revenue budgets less
ambiguous and more predictable. Simultaneously, the federal government continued issuing social
laws, which imposed the financial burden of implementing social mandates mostly on
municipalities. The federal government cited Article 132 of the Constitution as the legal basis for
transferring federal mandates to local governments but failed to follow its stipulations requiring the
simultaneous provision of resources to fulfill them. Since local budgets were inadequate to finance
federal mandates, municipalities considered themselves not liable to fulfill these mandates.
The fourth phase in the reforming process is dated by 1999 – 2001 when the revised Budget and
Tax Codes became applicable. These laws were of particular importance for restructuring fiscal
relations in the country as a whole, but they failed to set forth principles of reasonable financial
autonomy for local governments. This period is characterized by a concentration of tax revenues
and expenditure responsibilities at the federal and regional levels. Municipalities’ own revenues
were steadily shrinking while their reliance on regional transfers was growing. At this time, federal
authorities continued making critical changes in expenditure responsibilities of municipalities.
                                               
2 It should be noted that prior to the Constitution enactment, fiscal autonomy of local governments was already
stipulated in the Law On Fundamental Fiscal Rights and Rights to Form and Use Extra Budgetary Funds of
Representative and Executive Authorities of the Russian Federation Republics, Autonomous Oblasts and Okrugs,
Krays, Oblasts, Moscow and Petersburg Cities, Local Self-Governments, approved on April 15, 1993.
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What next? Over the past decade, there was increased understanding of the need for conceptual
municipal finance reforms rather than just changing the rules of the game. Conceptual reforms may
start no earlier than 2004 when universal tax reform is completed. The RF Government Program of
Fiscal Federalism Development covering the period up to 2005 has created important preconditions
for the municipal finance reform. The Program sets forth principles for the delineation of
expenditure responsibilities between all levels of government and provides guidelines for their
future re-distribution. The Program established principles for delineation of tax collection
authorities between governments, the most important of which was the rule that any level
government should use its own tax revenues as a main source of funds to fulfill its expenditure
responsibilities including equalization of differences in regional and municipal revenue flows.
Furthermore, federal authorities must consider provisions of the Program of Fiscal Federalism
Development when drafting federal laws and regulations. Actual progress in municipal finance
reform will depends on the willingness of lawmakers to adhere to these principles.
Since 2001, the delineation of fiscal responsibilities has become the main concern for a special
Presidential Commission headed by Kozak. In July 2002, the Presidential Commission suggested a
concept for the delineation of governmental fiscal authorities. The Commission   also prepared the
new draft of the law  On General Principles of the organization of local self-governance in the
Russian Federation,  which was introduced to the State Duma by President of RF on January 4,
2003. The draft foresees serious changes in Tax and Budget Codes.
In terms of fiscal autonomy of local budgets this law, in our view, preserve the current trend of
centralization of expenditure and revenue authorities of local governments, downgrading their
autonomy and grater involvement of local budgets in implementation of federal and regional tasks.
Chapter 5 examines the possible aftereffects of enforcement of the law.     
1.2. FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND AUTONOMY CONCEPT
According to analysts’ opinion (Bahl, 2000), the fiscal decentralization concept should provide a
distinct division of spending responsibilities between budgets of various levels as well as to provide
them with appropriate financial resources to fulfill these responsibilities. This approach to fiscal
decentralization provides for local government fiscal autonomy.
Fiscal autonomy in local expenditure planning suggests a certain degree of freedom for
municipalities in determining types, volume and methods of providing public services. Fiscal
autonomy in budget planning suggests the right of municipalities to introduce, change and
administer taxes. Typically, the introduction and revision of taxes is regulated by national laws. The
degree of revenue collection autonomy of local governments depends on their capacity to raise
revenues regardless of tax sharing rates and transfers annually set by state authorities.
Decentralization of fiscal relations and radically enhanced fiscal autonomy of local governments
will result in their increased independence in establishing their own tax revenue sources and public
services to be provided. Bahl (2000) suggests the following arguments:
?  If the people get more of what they want, whether it concerns the lower taxes or a wider
range of services, their well being improves.
?  People will have more incentives to pay taxes, if they get services they want in exchange for
tax compliance. Decentralization results in an improved rate of tax collection and payment
for services compared to more centralized system.
?  Local governments must provide effective and efficient services. The general community
understands that it pays for these services through its taxes and fess, and hence it may
choose not to elect a government that fails to fulfill this responsibility.
Fiscal decentralization and municipal autonomy have progressed slowly in Russia. One may
conclude that this is a consequence of macroeconomic factors, the most important of which is the
11
general weakness of the Russian economy. According to the World Bank statistics (World Bank,
2002), in 2001, Russia was 79th in the world for GDP per capita output with PPP considered. In a
centralized fiscal environment, a federal government has more flexibility and wider range of tools
to resolve macroeconomic problems, including financial stabilization issues.
During the survey period, the federal government decentralized spending responsibilities to
municipalities. Concurrently, there was a substantial drop in the contribution of local governments
in consolidated expenditure budgets.
1.3 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DELINEATION OF SPENDING RESPONSIBILITIES
AMONG GOVERNMENTS OF ALL LEVELS
Russian municipalities are guided by general principles related to the assignment of spending
responsibilities among levels of government. There principles are described below.
Subsidiary principle.  Under this principle, municipalities shall be entrusted with functions they are
capable of implementing.  All other functions shall be transferred to the federal and regional
authorities.  It should be noted that this principle, which can be also called the effective
complimentarily principle, envisages that the budget system is built from bottom up, and the
government is servicing municipalities to a certain extent.  Russia is a successor to the centralized
state – the Soviet Union, where the system was built in a reverse order.  Therefore, the subsidiary
principle in Russia is accepted with difficulty, and current fiscal relations do not comply with it.
Territorial compliance principle.  If a service is provided mainly in the territory of a municipality, it
shall serve as a justification for its decentralization to the local level of government.  If a service is
provided well beyond the border of a municipality, it shall be transferred to either regional
authorities or a central government.  This principle is followed in Russia, although with some
interesting peculiarities, which will be discussed later, do exist.
Financial efficiency principle.  This principle says that if the cost of a service depends on the scale
of its production, it shall be considered as a strong justification for determining the appropriate
level of government to provide the service.
1.4 ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL FACTORS OF ASSIGNING TAXES TO THE
LOCAL LEVEL
The Russian system of taxation is still in transition. As a result, the percentage each level of
government receives from a given tax has changed, as illustrated by Table 1 below. As the data
in the table demonstrates, the legislated rates for sharing three major tax revenues between
governments of all levels varied over the last 5 years.
Table 1. Legislated rates for sharing major tax revenues between the federal, regional and
local budgets (shown as a fraction of 100 percent revenue collections for VAT and income
taxes; and as effective collection rates - for profit tax)
Taxes Budget level 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Federal 75 75 85 100 100
Regional 15 15 15 0 0
VAT
Local 10 10 - - -
Federal 13 11 11 11 7.5
Regional 17 14 14 14 14.5
Profit
tax
Local 5 5 5 5 2
Federal 0 5* 16 8 0
Regional 50 45* 34 92 100
Income
tax
Local 50 50 50 - -
Notes.*. By estimation. In 1999, the income tax rates varies from 13 to 35 percent with 3 percent of tax rate
assigned to the federal budget, so not less then 27 percent of collected revenues  going to regional budgets.
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Value added tax (VAT). From 1992 to 1999 VAT was one of the main sources of revenues for
local budgets (in 1999, VAT accounted for 10 percent of total tax revenues of local
governments). Under the current law On Financial Principles of Local Self-Governance, 10
percent of VAT revenues should flow to local budgets, but after the recent revision of the tax
sharing rates they receive nothing. Under the same law, local governments are considered
eligible to 50 percent of income tax, but the recently enacted (2001) Budget Code repudiated
this provision.
The VAT is difficult to divide among different levels of government because the actual inflow
from VAT may not correspond to the actual added value registered in a region or local
government. Another major obstacle for assigning VAT to regional and local levels is the
foreign trade. This tax is collected from importers and reimbursed to exporters through the
federal budget thus making the tax sharing procedure rather ambiguous for regions and local
governments.
Corporate profit tax. At present, according to the RF Budget Code local governments are
eligible to 2 percent of revenues from the profit tax, but frequently Federation constituents
transfer revenues from this tax to municipalities using their own – regional - tax sharing rates).
The main inflow of profit tax revenues to the federal consolidated budget is produced by
vertically integrated companies that operate in the power and raw materials sectors and have
well-developed regional branch networks. The Tax Code provides a formula for splitting the
return from profit tax between regions. The regional and municipal shares of profits from a
regional branch operating within their jurisdiction are calculated as a simple average of the
payroll and residual property cost ratios of that branch (Tax Code, Part III, Article 288). The
reality is that large companies try to consolidate their profits in the central office (typically
located in Moscow), which means that regions and municipalities will receive less than that to
which they are entitles. This corporate behavior may be attributed to their intent to limit their
taxes by consolidating gains and losses of the company’s regional branches, and, therefore,
reduce the company’s tax commitments.
WINDOW 1. AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE FISCAL RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIAN
VERTICALLY INTEGRATED COMPANIES AND MUNICIPALITIES
In Russia, vertically integrated companies use a variety of methods for consolidating their
profits in their central office. For example, through 2001, municipal and regional governments
had rather high inflows from the profit tax paid by Transgas branches, a subsidiary of RAO
Gasprom. In 2002, Gasprom reduced tariffs for transporting gas via the Transgas network and
at the same time raised tariffs for the sale of gas through the Mezregiongas dealer network. As
a result, municipalities, such as Saratov, witnessed a decline in revenue flows from Gasprom
enterprises. Accordingly, in 2002, the Saratov Finance Department had to reimburse a regional
branch for the profit tax paid in advance, furthering straining Saratov’s limited budget
resources. The same situation was registered in several other municipalities.
Income tax. In advanced countries, the income tax is a main source of revenues for national
consolidated budgets. Most revenues generated by this tax flow to the federal budget. Regional
and local governments use the same tax base that the federal authorities do, and this
substantially facilitates the process of tax collection. Many economists consider that due to the
significant role of this tax in equalization of incomes at the national level, it is inappropriate to
allow collection of it at the regional and local levels as well (see, for example, Martinez and
Boex, 1998). However, if in addition to the federal collection of this tax regional and local
governments are also permitted to collect it at a minor flat rate (not related to income level), the
role of this tax as a major income equalizer remains the same. In many West European countries
municipalities are allowed to collect this tax.
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In Russia, the income tax collection is a flat rate set by the Tax Code. This approach varies from
the equity approach described above. In accordance with the 2002 Budget Law, all revenues
from federal income tax are first given to regional governments, and then distributed between
regional and local budgets via negotiations. Considering that for many municipalities the
income tax is the main source of revenues (in 2001, it was responsible for 34 percent of tax
revenues of municipalities and 21 percent of their total revenues according to the Russian
Ministry of Finance statistics on regional and local budget performance as of 01/01/2002), these
tax sharing negotiations are used by regions as a major instrument of financial control over
municipalities.
In Russia, the income tax is paid by employers on behalf of the employees (taxpayers). The
geographical location of the employer serves as the basis for the regional distribution of the
income tax regardless of the residence of the employees. This creates a situation wherein
regions, and local governments, may not receive their “fair share” of the distribution based on
where the taxpayer lives and consumes most public services.
Excises. Excises are a major source of revenues for regional rather than municipal budgets.
Municipalities are eligible only 5 percent of the excise tax collected according to the law. The
Russian practice of collecting excises from producers rather than purchasers resulted in
inadequate concentration of these revenues in separated localities. This adverse trend was
alleviated to a certain extent in 2001 with the introduction of the mechanism of excise
warehouses.
Retail sales tax. In many markets (the USA), and transition economies (Hungary), this tax is an
important source of local revenues.
Real estate tax. From Table 2 below is evident that in the USA and Canada the real estate tax is
the main revenue producer for local budgets.
Table 2. USA and Canada structure of municipal revenue sources
Canada USA
Municipalities’ own revenue sources, including 71,0 67,1
Property tax 49,5 21,0
Service fees 20,2 32,6
Other sources of municipalities’ own revenues 1,3 13,5
Transfers, total including 29 32,9
Transfers from the federal government 1,3 3,3
Transfers from state/county governments 21,0 23,4
Other sources 6,6 6,0
Source: Federation of Canadian Municipalities: “Early Warning: Will Canadian Cities Compete?” May 2001.
If one assess the above data in terms of Russian methods of reporting of budget statistics, one
finds the real estate tax equals 35 – 40% of total revenues of municipalities in the USA, and
much more than 50% in Canada.
In other developed countries, the real estate tax varies in importance as a source of income for
municipalities. Table 3 below shows the structure of municipal tax revenue sources of a sample
of developed federative countries.
Table 3. Structure of municipal revenue sources in selected OECD federative countries
Countries Specific tax revenues as a percent of total tax collection
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Income taxes Sales taxes Real estate taxes Other taxes
Australia 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0
Austria 56.0 30.3 9.6 4.1
Belgium 84.2 14.2 0.0 1.6
Canada 0.0 1.5 92.7 5.7
Germany 79.1 5.7 15.0 0.2
Switzerland 84.3 0.3 15.4 0.0
USA 6.3 21.0 72.8 0.0
Note. Income tax includes personal income tax and corporate profit tax.
Source: OECD, Revenue Statistics 1965-1999 (Paris: OECD, 2000), Tables 133,134.
In transitional economies, the property (real estate) tax is less popular with municipalities than
in the USA and Canada. Factors limiting its use include difficulty in property tax administration
and a lack of popular support.
In present-day Russia, three types of property tax are collected: a regional property tax imposed
on corporate property (with 50 percent of its returns flowing to local budgets), and two local
taxes – an individual property tax and a land tax (local governments are eligible to 50 percent of
these tax returns). In 2000, these three types of taxes accounted for 7.9 percent of municipal
revenues and 11.6 percent of total tax revenues; in 2001, these indicators increased to 8.2 and
13.5 percent respectively. Worth noting is the fact that Federation constituents when negotiating
their fiscal relations with municipalities may agree to cut down their share in the property tax
revenues in favor of municipalities. In 2002, the land tax rate was doubled and in 2003, it is
expected to grow yet by 80 percent.
Russian property tax policies and practices require changes in both the methods of determining
the property base and collection rates. The Law on Corporate Property Tax is imposed on
residual value of tangible and intangible assets, stock and inputs that are on the balance sheet of
a corporate taxpayer. However, capital assets of Russian enterprises are depreciated at more than
45 percent by early 2001, according to the State Statistics Committee, and regular revaluation of
assets has not been performed since 1998. Therefore, in most cases stock and costs become the
main elements of the tax base while capital assets, buildings and structures remain an
insignificant part of it. One may conclude that the corporate property tax now collected in
Russia has actually little in common with the property tax collected in market economies. It is
anticipated that in the next two years serious changes will be made in the regulation of this tax.
Specifically, it is suggested to impose this tax only on depreciable property.
Taxes from individual property in Russia are collected at a rather low rate and accordingly
generate much lower revenues as compared to revenues from the corporate tax.
The RF Ministry of Finance is going to introduce the real estate tax in Russia in 2004. It will
exist in parallel with the now-collected three types of the property tax, and it will be the
responsibility of regional and local governments to decide which of them to collect. Economic
and administrative preparatory work preceding the introduction of the real estate tax in Russia
was started in 1997 with the adoption of federal law On Conducting a Pilot Project on Taxation
of Real Property in the Cities of Veliky Novgorod and Tver.
WINDOW 2. INTRODUCTION OF REAL ESTATE TAX IN VELIKY NOVGOROD
The federal law of 1997 served as the basis for the adoption in 1999 of the Oblast Law on
Conducting a Pilot Project on Taxation of Real Property in the City of Veliky Novgorod. The pilot
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project is to be implemented in 2000 – 2003. In 2000, the Novgorod City Duma issued a resolution
in which it approved the proposed Real Estate Tax Regulation.
Article 6 of this Regulation establishes rates for collecting real estate taxes in the locality. Real
estate taxes from individual residential houses, apartments, residential premises, summer cottages
belonging to natural persons should be assessed at 0.5 percent of taxable value of a real property
unit, and real property units used for industrial purposes as well as other types of real property will
be subject to taxation at 2 percent of their taxable value (similar to the real estate tax rate set for
legal entities).
A set of documents designed to regulate the introduction of the real estate tax includes: Rules for
Keeping a Register of Taxable Real Property, and Guidelines for Appraising the Taxable Value of
Real Property Units. Unlike the corporate property tax, which uses balance sheet data, the
Guidelines suggests using a various formulas for determining the value of a real property: One
example is as follows:
V=K1*(K2*K3*K4*K5*K6*A1*B1+K7*B2*A2) where
V- taxable value of real property;
K1 – property location factor;
K2 – property depreciation factor ;
K3 – property purpose designation factor;
K4 – wall materials factor;
K5 – property type and size factor;
K6 – construction quality factor;
A1 – total area of a property;
B1 – base cost of 1 sq. m of a property;
K7 – land plot purpose designation factor;
B2 – total area of a land plot;
A2 – base cost of 1 sq. m of a land plot.
The development of several “test” formulas underscores the conceptual and technical difficulties
faced when transitioning from the property tax to a real estate tax. Among the various issues to be
resolved:
?  The basis for assessing property value;
?  The conflict arising from the recent free privatization of housing when millions of Russians
became homeowners at no cost resulting in many cases where there is a substantial gap
between household income and value of respective housing;
?  The economic condition of municipality and its impact on commercial property owners.
From a local government perspective, any formula should not diminish the municipal revenue
bases because of abolishing the property taxes.
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2. MUNICIPAL REVENUE BUDGETS
One of the fundamentals of decentralization is to provide municipalities with adequate and
predictable own source revenues. Municipalities have a variety of potential revenue sources
categorized as follows:
Government’s own revenue sources including:
?  Local taxes and fees;
?  Share of federal and regional taxes assigned to local budgets by the federal
law (Tax and Budget Codes, other federal laws);
?  Other sources such as grants or sale of assets.
Transfers in an extended sense including:
?  Shares of federal and regional taxes annually negotiated and assigned to local
budgets;
?  Equalization transfers.
2.1.  MUNICIPAL REVENUES REFORM
The early 90s gave start to the practice of planning municipal budgets based on their shares in
federal and regional taxes. Main tax revenues that were split between budgets of all levels were
the value-added tax, profit tax paid by legal entities, income tax paid by citizens, and excises.
The reforms suggested in the early 90s failed to provide municipalities with their own-source
tax base. The concept of municipal fiscal autonomy failed to become a part of the general
concept of municipal reform.
In 1993, revenues from VAT, profit tax, and excises were split between the federal center and
regional governments under different sharing rates. Federal equalization transfers were also
distributed in an unregulated manner. Regions also built their fiscal relations with municipalities
using the same pattern. This practice was a significant disincentive for regional and local
governments to initiate their own tax revenue capacities.
Reform undertaken in 1994 resulted in establishment of single rates for sharing the so-called
regulated taxes (this term was invented yet in the Soviet era) between regions. Simultaneously
the Fund for Financial Support of Regions was created to serve as a mechanism for regulating
the flow of federal equalization transfers to regions.
The 1994 fiscal reform failed to affect the fiscal relations between local and regional
governments. Municipal finance was put under the control of regional authorities. Within this
environment, certain regions revised their municipal tax sharing rates several times a year.
Neither the federal center nor local governments agreed with such situation. Certain steps
towards better regulation of fiscal relations between regional and local governments were taken.
The Presidential decree On Main Components of the Fiscal Reform and Measures to be Taken
to Strengthen Fiscal and Payment Discipline (as of 05/08/96) set minimum shares of revenues
that budgets of all levels including local ones were expected to receive from regulated taxes
starting from January 1, 1997.
The federal law On Financial Principles of Local Self Governance in the Russian Federation
(adopted in August 1997) was another attempt to regulate fiscal relations between regional and
local governments. Article 9 of the law provided unified procedures for sharing taxes and
equalization transfers with municipalities. Article 7 of the law required that at least 10 percent of
revenues from privatization of public property located within municipalities should flow to local
budgets. However, there is no evidence that this provision of the law was fulfilled. Moreover the
law was suspended January 1, 2002.
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The federal law, On Financial Principles, as well as the abovementioned decree, suggest setting
fixed tax sharing rates for local governments. For VAT, this rate was set as 10 percent (for VAT
paid from domestic products, excluding precious metals and stones supplied by the RF State
Fund of Precious Metals and Stones), for income tax it made up 50 percent, for corporate profit
tax – 5 percent, for alcohol excise – 5 percent, for other excises (excluding mineral resources,
gasoline, cars, and excisable imported goods) – 10 percent, and for corporate property tax – 50
percent.
The two acts – the Presidential Decree and the law On Financial Principles - allowed regional
governments the flexibility to vary the tax sharing rates for municipalities above the set
minimums. One variable resulting from these acts is that cities receiving revenues from federal
and local taxes at higher rates than the minimum could witness a revenue decline.
In addition to average tax sharing rates, the law On Financial Principles provided for the
formation of funds for financial support to municipalities within regional budgets. First regional
funds of this type were created in 1994 right after the creation of a similar fund at the federal
level. Currently, such funds are formed in many regions but transfers from them are distributed
among municipalities in a rather arbitrary manner.
In 1998 – 1999, the Fiscal Policy Center proposed its own model of distribution of intraregional
transfers that the RF Finance Ministry used as the basis for issuing its Interim Recommendations
on Regulation of Intraregional Transfers.  The model is designed to estimate:
?  the amount of municipal equalization transfers a regional government should make
shown separately for each municipality;
?  the tax sharing rates differentiated in accordance with municipalities;
?  the amount of financial aid a regional fund should provide to help municipalities
receive a required flow of revenues.
The pilot testing of the model was carried out in a selection of regions. In Rostovskaya Oblast,
the Interim Recommendations are used regularly for planning the Oblast annual budget.
Today most regions fail to adhere to standardized practices of sharing revenue with their
respective municipalities. As a result, some municipal budgets are mostly based on regional
equalization transfers while others chiefly rely on proceeds from regulated taxes. Typically, the
availability or lack of a well-developed local tax base is used as a rationale of these differences.
Many hopes were set on the new Tax and Budget Codes (The Budget Code is in effect from
01/01/2000, and the Tax Code, Part 1 – from 01/01/1999 and Part II – from 01/01/2001).
Although these documents add consistency to the national tax and budgetary laws, they still fail
to eliminate imperfections in the Russian budgetary system.
The drafters of the Tax Code were governed by rather diverse objectives. The Code does not
enhance the fiscal autonomy of local governments. On the contrary, the Code provides just a
closed and rather limited list of local taxes and fees including:
?  Land tax
?  Personal property tax
?  Advertisement tax
?  Legacy, or gift tax
?  Local licensing fees.
This list is by far shorter than the one provided by the 1991 law, On Fundamentals of the Tax
System in the Russian Federation. The Article of the Tax Code setting an abridged list of local
taxes and fees (all in all five of them) will come into force only after the repeal of this Law.
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At present, this law permits local governments to impose and collect 22 local taxes and fees.
Yet, municipalities are disallowed to collect 16 types of local taxes by federal law of November
27, 2001(Sale Tax Low) if Federation constituents introduce the sales tax on their territories.
Yet, the federal law of November 27, 2001(Sale Tax Low) disallows to collect 16 types of local
taxes to municipalities if Federation constituents introduce the sales tax on their territories.  This
is a very good illustration of “implementation” of the fiscal autonomy principle proclaimed in
the Budget Code. Perhaps, there are municipalities that do receive extra revenues from the sales
tax, 60 percent of which, according to the law, should remain in their budgets, but still this law
has significantly limited the fiscal autonomy of local governments.
2.2. RUSSIAN SYSTEM OF BUDGETARY REVENUE SHARING
The municipalities’ contribution to the consolidated budget of the Russian Federation, in
particular, and the national economy, in general, may be evaluated based on Table 4, below.












1992 18,8 13,8 6,8 7,0
1993 13,1 16,6 8,4 8,2
1994 13,6 18,2 9,7 8,5
1995 14,2 14,8 7,5 7,3
1996 12,8 14,9 9,1 10,2
1997 13,8 17,5 10.4 10.9
1998 11,9 15,1 8,9 8,7
1999 12,9 13,9 8,3 6,8
2000 16,0 15,0 10,0 6,4
2001 17,5 14,2 10,1 6,2
2002 16,3 14,8 10,9 6,5
Note. Due to transfers, the 1992-95 indicators may be based on overlapping calculations. Calculation of
consolidated regional contributions to GDP was made without regard for region’s own turnover indicators. The
2001 indicators are based on estimate data. Source: Freinkman et al., Russian Economic Trends (1988,2); RF
Ministry of Finance; Russian Statistical Yearbook, Goskomstat, 2001.
The data presented in Table 4 may be supplemented by those in Table 5, which are more
relevant, from our point of view.
Table 5. Distribution of revenues between budgets of all levels excluding expenditures on
financial transfers to lower level budgets (percent of GDP)






1996 10,8 15,0 4,9 10,2
1997 10,8 17,5 6,6 10,9
1998 9,7 15,1 6,3 8,75
1999 11,3 13,9 7,1 6,8
2000 14,6 15,1 8,7 6,4
2001 15,1 14,3 7,8 6,5
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2002 13,5 14,8 8,3 6,5
Source: calculations based on the Ministry of Finance data
From Table 5, it appears that the Russian system of fiscal relations changed after the 1998
financial crisis. The role of the federal budget substantially increased. If, in the 90s, it was
responsible for just 12-14 percent of GDP (excluding 1992), in 2000-2001 its contribution to the
GDP increased to 16-17.5 percent. This growth was encouraged by three factors. First, tax
revenues were reallocated for the benefit of the federal center. Specifically, the practice of
splitting VAT between budgets of all levels stopped in 2000. Second, a favorable situation that
was registered on the resource market right after the 1998 crisis that encouraged the growth in
tax revenues to the federal budget. Third, one of the aftereffects of the financial crisis was the
improved collection of federal taxes, and termination of the practice of offsets and in-kind
payment of taxes at the federal level. In 1999 – 2000 enterprises ‘and organizations’ debts,
payable including their debts due to the federal budget were reduced in real terms.
Along with the improved ratio of the federal budget to GDP, the federal/regional consolidated
budget ratio improved. In 2000, for the first time since 1992, revenues of the federal budget
exceeded revenues of a consolidated regional budget.
In recent years, changes in the revenue structure of consolidated regional budgets show the
growing importance of regional own source revenues. These changes are a result of the growing
motivation of regional governments to bind themselves with expenditure responsibilities of
municipalities.
Annual rates of growth (decline) in revenues of local budgets in 1996 – 2002 are shown in Table
6 below.
Table 6. Local revenue growth rate versus the previous year, 1996-2002
Years 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Local revenue growth rate (as
against the previous year) 112.2 74.2 84.4 100.1 104.8 104,4
Local revenue growth rate (as
against the base year, 1996) 112,2 83.1 70.1 70.2 73.5 76,7
Source: RF Ministry of Finance, RF State Statistics Committee. For adjustment purposes the GDP deflators were
used. The 2001 indicators are estimated.
Table 6 shows that over the six last years, revenues of Russian municipalities dropped by 23-24
percent. The drop in 1998 after the revival registered in 1997 was driven by the financial system
crisis, which substantially reduced the flow of funds from taxpayers. In 1999, the drop was
mostly caused by shift of revenues from local to oblast budgets. The 2001 and 2002 growth in
local revenues is quite compatible with the GDP growth.
2.3. STRUCTURE OF MUNICIPAL REVENUES
Table 7 below shows the structure of municipal revenue budgets over the last 7 years.
Table 7. Structure of municipal revenues in 1996 – 2002 (percent)
Revenues/years 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Tax revenues,
including 59.5 60.5 63.6 69.4 68,2 61.2 53,5
VAT 7.1 7.5 7.9 6.8 5,3 0 0
Profit tax 11.5 9.3 9.1 14.6 13,5 16.7 10,9
Income tax 16.95 18.2 18.4 16.6 16,8 21.1 23,3
Property taxes 9.2 8.9 10.0 7.8 6,2 6.7 7,1







N/a N/a 11.2 13.4 14.9 5.1 3,1
Non-tax revenues 2.4 2.2 3.7 3,6 3.5 4.3 6,0
Transfers 37.8 37.3 32.5 26,7 28.3 34.2 40,5
Municipalities’ own
revenues 24.92 27,6 27.5 18.9 18,7
Source: RF Ministry of Finance, specifically provided for the purposes of this investigation.
The above data are useful for identifying the most important trends in formation of local revenue
budgets from 1996 – 2002. During this period, the Tax and Budget Codes were designed and
enacted, and revised; other acts providing regulations for municipal finance were issued; and the
country suffered a severe financial crisis. In this context, the revenue structure of municipalities
remained dynamic and subject to change.
One of the indicators of the municipal revenue structure is the ratio between their tax revenues
and transfers. In 1996 – 1999, the share of tax revenues in municipalities’ revenue structure
grew while the share of transfers from budgets of higher levels was falling. This led some
researchers (see, Martinez and Boex, 1998) to declare that the role of regional transfers in the
structure of local revenue budgets was decreasing. However, the transitional period in Russia
produced no long-term trends upon which to predict the future. For example, in 1999, the
emerging trend towards growth in local tax revenues reversed in response to restructuring the
tax system. No one predicted this change; it was a result of the overall process of centralization
of fiscal relations in Russia.
As is evident from Table 7, the individual income tax was the main source of revenue for
municipalities over the six-year period. However, the income tax, as the main source of
municipal revenue, is not secured by law. The Law On Financial Principles …  requires
transferring at least 50 percent of this revenue to local budgets. At the same time, Chapter 23 of
the Tax Code (Individual Income Tax), as revised at the end of 2000, provides no regulations on
dividing these tax revenues among levels of government. Consequently, distribution rates were
set in the annually adopted budget laws. For example, in 2001, revenues from the individual
income tax were distributed as follows: revenues in amount of 1 percent of the tax rate were
forwarded to the federal budget, and the rest (12 percent of the tax rate) came to regional
budgets. In 2002, all revenues from the income tax were forwarded to regional budgets that
forwarded them on to municipalities through a negotiation process.
The profit tax is the second most important source of revenues for municipalities. After 1998,
the importance of this tax for local revenue grew remarkably mostly because of first a reduction
and second a stop in the flow of VAT revenues to local budgets. Like the income tax, the profit
tax sharing rates for local budgets are set through negotiations with regional governments. From
1996 to 2001, this rate was 5 percent. In January 2002, this rate was reduced to 2 percent. Given
these annual changes, local revenues from the profit are difficult to predict.
Using the indicators from Table 7, one may define municipalities’ own revenues as inflows
from property taxes, sales tax, local taxes (including land tax), shares of VAT, corporate profit
and individual income taxes set by the federal law. As noted earlier, revenues from the sales tax
and corporate property tax may exceed rates set by the law. With this factor taken into account,
it is possible to determine the share of municipalities’ own revenues in their total revenues in
1998 – 2000 as 25 – 27.5 percent. In 2001, this share was drastically curtailed in response to the
abolishment of the housing and communal service tax. One may agree that the removal of this
tax was a necessary step in improvement of the tax system in general. However, this decision
resulted in the curtailment of municipalities’ own revenues.
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The ratio between municipalities’ own to its total revenues is a good indicator of their fiscal
autonomy. According to Table 7, this indicator remained the same over the whole period under
survey, 1996 – 2000, with a slight growth registered in 1999 and 2000 due to the increased
importance of the profit and income tax for local governments. In 2001, this indicator
demonstrated a sharp fall mostly due to the tax changes noted above. Therefore, one may
conclude that tax reform over the past several years has diminished the fiscal autonomy of
municipalities.
2.4. STRUCTURE OF REVENUES OF SELECTED RUSSIAN CITIES
The examination of the structure of municipal revenues based on average Russian data can be
supplemented with figures obtained from the analysis of data from different Russian cities.
To that end, we used budget statistics from 79 Russian cities3 for 1999 through 2001. The
population of the selected cities varies from 200 to 1,300 thousand people. Most of them are capital
cities of subjects of the Russian Federation, which are economically the most developed cities in
their regions. Naturally, this factor has a certain impact on results of our analysis. Moreover, the
cities under analysis belong to different subjects of the Russian Federation, which have different
geographic, social, economic and financial characteristics. For instance, Samara, Ufa, Nizhni
Novgorod, Yekaterinburg and some other cities represent regions with diversified economies,
whose budgets are hardly dependent on the federal financial aid. But Pskov, Ulan-Ude, Chita and
Kostroma are centers of regions that are currently in an economic slump, their budgetary policy is
very much dependent on fund flows from the center. The sample also includes some raw-materials
producing cities in Northern Russia (Norilsk, Surgut, Nizhnevartovsk and others), which have very
high per capita budget revenue indicators, and poor cities located in the South of the Russian
Federation (Makhachkala and others). Overall, the geographical distribution of the cities included
in the sample is rather even, it covers 60 subjects of the Russian Federation.
The cities under consideration differ greatly in levels of aggregate per capita budget revenues
(which we refer to as the "budget strength"). The variance of this parameter, when adjusted for
differences between local prices in different regions, is shown in Table 8. For the purposes of
illustration, the 2001 municipal government distribution according to their budget strength is
presented in Chart 1. It shows that the per capita budget revenues in the richest city Norilsk, were
17 times as great as those in the city of Omsk. Chart 1 also shows that the per capita budget
revenues in richest the cities in our sample (Norilsk, Surgut and Nizhnevartovsk) were larger than
those in Moscow and St. Petersburg, which are the cities of federal significance.
Table 8. Differences in Budget Strength (in rubles) in 1999 through 2001
Min. Max. Mean Variation
coefficient
1999 1260 20784 3002 1.029
2000 1754 48000 4191 1.581
2001 2510 43963 5344 1.151
                                               
3 Angarsk, Astrakhan, Bryansk, Veliki Novgorod, Volgograd, Dzerzhinsk, Yekaterinburg, Yoshkar-Ola, Kemerovo, Kirov, Naberezhnye Chelny,
Nizhni Novgorod, Nizhni Tagil, Omsk, Orel, Orenburg, Perm, Petrozavodsk, Pskov, Severodvinsk, Tver, Chita, Arkhangelsk, Blagoveshchensk,
Vladikavkaz, Volzhski, Vologda, Kaliningrad, Kostroma, Murmansk, Penza, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski, Saransk, Saratov, Smolensk, Syktyvkar,
Ulan Ude, Bratsk, Kazan, Krasnodar, Nizhnekamsk, Novorossiisk, Taganrog, Ufa, Khabarovsk, Shakhty, Balakovo, Vladivostok, Vladimir,
Voronezh, Irkutsk, Kaluga, Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Krasnoyarsk, Kurgan, Lipetsk, Makhachkala, Nalchik, Novosibirsk, Ryazan, Sochi, Sterlitamak,
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Chart 1
Distribution of 79 Russian cities according to budget strength in 2001
It should be noted that the available data characterizing the situation in these cities varied over time.
In 2000 the data were available for only 48 cities. However, despite this variance, we can still
identify significant differences among municipalities.
An analysis of the budget data from the cities included in the sample shows that the share of
transfers from the federal budget grew in 80% of municipalities in 1999 through 2001, with the
most visible growth registered in 2001.
WINDOW 3. CLUSTER ANALYSIS OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE
STRUCTURE
A method of statistical data analysis known as the cluster analysis may be useful for the purposes of
analyzing the revenue structure on the basis of sample data. In our case, the original data is city
budget data presented in the data base. The parameters that characterize the structure of municipal
budget revenues include: tax revenues, non-tax revenues and non-repayable transfers to municipal
budgets.
The application of this procedure to the 1999-2001 data makes it possible to divide municipalities
into three  groups according to the structure of their budget revenues. However, there are several
cities with an "unusual" structure of budget revenues, which can not be included in any of the
clusters.
The three groups are characterized mostly by the proportions of tax revenues and non-repayable
transfers, while the shares of non-tax revenues differ insignificantly in all groups, amounting to
about 5%.
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Group 1 includes cities with a large share of tax revenues (about 90%) and, accordingly, a
relatively small share of transfers in municipal budget revenues.
Group 2 includes municipalities characterized by average-size shares of both tax revenues (about
80%) and transfers in their budget revenues.
Group 3 consists of cities characterized by a relatively small share of tax revenues in their budget
revenues (not greater than 70%) and a significant share of transfers.
Exceptions included cities whose budget revenues are formed more than 50% by financial aid
(Makhachkala in 1999 and Shakhty in 2000 through 2001) and cities with an unusually high share
of non-tax revenues in their budgets (Vologda and Cherepovets in 1999 and Angarsk in 2000).
Let us analyze the following table, which shows the number of cities in each group, changes in
budget revenue structure in each group  and the main cities that formed each group  from 1999 to
2001.















1999 32 92% 3% 5%
2000 24 91% 4% 4%
1
2001






1999 23 82% 13% 5%
2000 15 81% 13% 6%
2





1999 8 70% 27% 3%
2000 7 68% 28% 4%
3
2001 15 57% 38% 4%
Nalchik
Ulan-Ude
The data presented in Table 9 confirms our thesis that the structure of municipal budget revenues
can hardly be characterized as stable, only a small number of cities included in the sample stayed in
the same group  from 1999 to  2001.
Relationship between budget strength and structure of revenues
When analyzing budget strength indicators characterizing the cities included in the sample, we can
first identify three industrial centers, Surgut, Norilsk and Nizhnevartovsk, which are characterized
by an extremely high per-capita budget revenue figure (more than 15000 rubles in each year in the
period under review).
These cities are also present in the above-described Group 1. The group consists of municipalities
with a high share of tax revenues in their budget revenues which account for the fact that budget
strength of the cities belonging to this group is higher than in other groups.
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However, it will be reasonable to analyze budget strength indicators in Groups 1, 2 and 3 without
taking into account these cities.
The table below shows median indicators instead of mean because median indicators reduce the
impact of extremities and are thus more reliable.
Table 10. Median Budget Strength indicators of Russian Cities by Groups
Group / Year 1999 2000 2001
1 2052 3225 3657
2 2038 2651 3949
3 2985 3099 4131
We can now see that greater budget strength is not connected with the smaller share of transfers in
total revenues.
Overall, when comparing municipal governments' revenue structure indicators with their budget
strength, we can see that, only one statistically significant indicator, the budget strength, had a
positive relationship with the share of the profit tax.
2.5  VERTICAL BALANCE OF FISCAL RELATIONS: THE REGIONAL LEVEL
One of the key points of the budget reform, in general, and the municipal finance reform, in
particular, is the balance of revenue sources and expenditure responsibilities of municipalities.
The relationship between these two indicators is important for describing the extent to which the
vertical balance of local budgets is achieved. The greater the dependence of local budgets on
regulated taxes and transfers, the greater their vertical imbalance. From Table 7 it is evident that
local budgets became more dependent on transfers of various kinds. Fiscal autonomy of
municipalities is shrinking.
Table 11 presents general trends for this indicator for a sample of regions. It is designed to help
assess the extent of vertical balance of local budgets across the Russian Federation and across
the Volga Federal District (VFD) in 2000 and 2001.
Table 11. Ration of transfers of revenues to local budgets
Regions/years 2000 2001
Russia, total 0.28 0.34
Mordoviya Republic 0.22 0.33
Ulyanovsk Oblast 0.12 0.29
Chuvash Republic 0.34 0.58
Tatarstan Republic 0.17 0.38
Saratov Oblast 0.14 0.16
Komi-Permyatsky Autonomous Okrug 0.72 0.82
Perm Oblast 0.30 0.28
Orenburg Oblast 0.18 0.27
Kirov Oblast 0.25 0.41
Bashkortostan Republic 0.39 0.44
Udmurt Republic 0.23 0.24
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast 0.20 0.29
Samara Oblast 0.14 0.14
Penza Oblast 0.25 0.34
Mary El Republic 0.34 0.38
Source: RF Ministry of Finance report on regional consolidated budget performance as of 01/01/2001 and as of 01/01/2002.
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Table 11 indicates that vertical fiscal imbalance in regions increased from 2001 to 2000. This
conclusion is also true for most of VFD regions. Most vertically imbalanced is the budgetary
system in Komi-Permyatsky Okrug. In 2001, 80 percent of expenditures of its municipalities
were funded by upper-level transfers.
The Chuvash Republic experience of regulating fiscal relations is noteworthy. Following
provisions of the law On Regulation of Fiscal Relations in Chuvash Republic (July, 2001), all
local budgets became eligible to receive revenues from federal and regional taxes and fees as
well as other revenue sources at equal rates for at least three years. By establishing this fiscal
relation with municipalities, the regional government replicated the pattern of relations between
the federal center and regions introduced by the 1994 budget reform.
Hypothetically, the Chuvash law was expected to help municipalities increase their tax
revenues. However, because of this law, municipal reliance on revenues from federal and
regional regulated taxes weakened, while their dependence on regional authorities grew.
Municipalities generating tax revenue in excess of the funds they received became more reliant
on transfers in addition to the poorer municipalities that were already receiving more in financial
resources than they generated in tax revenue. In practice, after the introduction of the law, the
share of transfers in all Chuvash municipal budgets increased from 34 to 58 percent.
Approaches to fiscal relations at the regional level should considers ways to enhance, rather than
diminish, the revenue raising capacity and fiscal autonomy of at least selected municipalities.
The principal conclusions suggested by this analysis of the dynamics and structure local
governments’ revenues are:
?  The type of ongoing tax reforms have reduced the fiscal autonomy of municipalities in
revenue collection;
?  Over the last five years, local governments revenues dropped by 26 percent. As opposed
to federal and regional governments, revenues of municipalities were particularly
seriously cut during the last three years.
?  The ten-year long revision of the federal tax law made the revenue structure of local
budgets particularly unsustainable.
?  The vertical balance of budgets in regions deteriorated in the post-crisis period.
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3. SPENDING RESPONSIBILITIES AND EXPENDITURE BUDGETS OF
MUNICIPALITIES
3.1. LEGISLATIVE REGULATION OF SPENDING RESPONSIBILITIES OF
RUSSIAN MUNICIPALITIES
At present, there is no clear description of the spending responsibilities between the budgets of
different government levels in Russia.  Radical economic reforms were initiated in 1991-1992 in
the absence of any concept for local government development, including municipal finance and
inter-budgetary relations.  Maintaining the centralized system of fiscal relations in the early 90s
involving: preservation of policies and practices of tax revenue regulation; substantial reallocation
of financial resources at the federal level; centralization of tax authorities; and unification of budget
legislation, was not the result of conscious policy decisions.
Before the adoption of the RF Constitution in 1993, the focus of reform was on the Russian state
development. Russia had no laws governing the division of budgetary responsibilities, and therefore
the fiscal relations between governments continued to be regulated in line with the previous Soviet-
era principles.
The Constitution also did not distinguish responsibilities of governments of different levels.
Articles 71 and 72 specify only responsibilities that are in the purview of the Russian Federation, as
well as responsibilities that are the domain of both the Russian Federation and the Federation
constituents. However, Article 132 stated that the state may assign additional responsibilities to
municipalities. Local governments were not allowed to transfer their responsibilities to upper-level
governments. Under this subsidiary system, the central government transfers to the municipal level
all responsibilities it may wish to transfer.
The list of responsibilities assigned to local governments was quoted in Article 6 of the Federal
Law On General Principles of Local Self Governance in the Russian Federation adopted in 1995.
However, many definitions and provisions in the law required clarification and were at odds with
the existing division of spending responsibilities. Specifically, the law did not contain any
references to spending responsibilities of local governments in the education sector.  It is safe to say
that this Law and the Law On Financial Basis for Local Self Governance in the Russian
Federation, adopted in 1997, failed to place a significant impact on the municipal finance.
After the Law On General Principles of Local Self Governance in the Russian Federation was
adopted, the problems of division of responsibilities between budgets of various levels continued to
be discussed.  These discussions manifested themselves in the provisions of the Budget Code.
Spending responsibilities specified in Article 86 of the Budget Code are those to be fulfilled
exclusively by the regional governments leading one to conclude that their main responsibility is
“to provide financial assistance” to local governments (local revenue equalization) and “to ensure
the fulfillment of selected state mandates assigned to municipal governments (payment of
subventions to municipalities).
Article 87 of the Budget Code specifies spending responsibilities that should be exclusively
fulfilled by local governments:
?  Establishment and management of the municipal property;
?  Establishment, maintenance and development of education, health, cultural
development, sports and fitness facilities, mass media, other institutions and
organizations owned or managed by municipalities;
?  Funding of the municipal law enforcement authorities;
?  Establishment, maintenance and development of municipal housing and communal
services;
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?  Municipal road construction and maintenance of roads of local importance;
?  Landscaping and planting of greenery in the territory of municipalities;
?  Domestic waste management and treatment (except for radioactive waste);
?  Maintenance of burial places managed by municipal governments
?  Organization of transportation services for the people and institutions owned or
managed by municipalities;
?  Funding of the fire protection activities;
?  Environment protection measures in the territory of municipalities;
?  Implementation of target programs adopted by municipalities;
?  Servicing and repayment of municipal debts;
?  Provision of targeted subsidies to the people;
?  Maintenance of municipal archives;
?  Holding of municipal elections and local referenda;
?  Other expenditures.
If the share of municipal expenditures in the consolidated budget of the country can be considered
as a quantitative criterion for the assessment of decentralization processes, then Russia can be
regarded as one of the world leaders in this process.  Comparative data on the share of local
governments’ expenditures in the consolidated national budgets of selected countries are presented
in Table 12 below.
Table 12. Local governments’ expenditures in the consolidated national budgets











Czech Republic 1995 20.9
Denmark 1995 44.0
The Netherlands 1995 23.57
Norway 1994 31.6
Poland 1996 19.48
Great Britain 1998 22.0
Source: The Ministry of Finance and the State Statistical Committee of the Russian Federation.
The  data in Table 12 show that only the Denmark outranks Russia in terms of having a bigger
share of expenditures from the local budgets in the consolidated national budgets.
Reduction of the share of local budget expenditures in the consolidated budget of Russia registered
in the few last years is caused by the growth of federal spending responsibilities in the consolidated
budget and the growth of regional expenditures incurred in the fulfillment of municipal spending
responsibilities by regional governments.
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The present spending responsibilities of Russian municipalities is a reflection of the limits of power
delegated to them during the Soviet period. The early and mid 90s witnessed the continuation of the
ad hoc assignment of responsibilities to municipalities. By the end of 90s, such practices generally
ended. The current structure of governments’ responsibilities was codified in the late 90s.
Local governments have little autonomy when deciding what service to provide, and the policy and
standards used to provide them.
3.2. FEDERAL MANDATES
Federal mandates, or spending responsibilities, account for a large percentage of municipal
expenditures. In the 90s, such responsibilities were delegated to municipalities without adequate
federal financial resources to implement them. This practice helped to alleviate the federal budget
deficit, moreover that the federal government was at all times lacking funds to implement its social
programs.
At present, there are five groups of federal laws and regulations governing spending
responsibilities of governments at all levels in Russia:
1) Laws and regulations the implementation of which is the discrete responsibility of the federal,
regional and local governments;
2) Laws and regulations the implementation of which is the joint responsibility of the federal
and regional governments (Federation constituents), without a distinct division of authority;
3) Laws and regulations the implementation of which is the responsibility of regional
governments which, however, may be transferred to lower-level governments;
4) Laws and regulations the implementation of which is the responsibility of local governments;
5) Laws and regulations that fail to mention the level of government responsible for their
implementation.
The lack of clarity in the legislation causes various problems when implementing federal
mandates (especially during implementation of mandates arising from the laws of the fifth type).
Furthermore, the fiscal impact of adopted mandates for governments is not calculated. There are
only numerous estimates of additional needs in financial resources.
As of 1999, more than 120 federal laws call for providing subsidies and benefits to specific
population groups. Regional and local governments are expected to pay for 37 types of subsidies
and benefits.  Moreover, the number of eligible groups who can claim certain types of benefits
can reach 60.  There are 236 population categories in Russia who are considered eligible to
receive social subsidies and benefits.  The total number of benefits and subsidies in Russia is
157.
As is evident from the IUE’s study of unfunded mandates (Institute for Urban Economics,
2001), the largest federal mandates are estimated at 3-4 percent GDP, or 20-25 percent of the
consolidated regional and local budgets of the Russian Federation. At the same time, the average
level of federal funding of mandates for Federation constituents was about 35 percent in the 90s,
and 60 percent presently.
Due to the lack of financial resources in the 90s even the relatively wealthy regions were
characterized with 40-50% compliance rate with mandates although in the last two year the
situation improved (Institute for Urban Economics, 2001).
The main generators of mandated expenses for local budgets are the following federal laws: the
law On Veterans, On State Allowances to Persons Having Children, On Social Protection of the
Disabled in the Russian Federation, and On Education.
There is no relationship between the level of funded federal mandate expenditures and budget
security of municipalities. According to Russian cities’ statistics, in 1999 the highest compliance
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rate with the execution of public spending responsibilities was demonstrated by cities with
average budget security (the per capita resources varying between 1 to 2 thousand rubles).
Real expenditures on execution of the “federal mandates” vary significantly between cities at
different points in time. The calculation process gets complicated because some benefits and
subsidies are financed as totals, without breaking them into groups as per laws and regulations.
Resources for funding federal mandates are usually allocated in the budgets of subjects and
municipalities of the Russian Federation based on the sector criterion (subsidies for housing and
utilities, free public transportation, etc.). In addition, some local governments fund only a
limited number of mandates based on their budget capacity.
The financially “heaviest” federal mandate, although it is not usually understood as a mandate,
is the tariff regulation of public servants’ salaries. Unlike other federal mandates, payment of
municipal salaries to employees who provide mandate services is a municipal responsibility.
Without the tariff regulation, public servants would still be paid but, perhaps, at another rate.
Alongside with the tariff regulation there exist many other federal standards that local
governments must follow when planning their expenditure.
According to RF Finance Ministry statistics, in 2001 about 30 percent of all municipal
expenditures were spent on salaries for public servants. While other federal mandates are funded
partially, if funded at all, the payment of public servants salaries is the highest municipal
priority.
In November 2002, a resolution was passed increasing public servants’ average salary by a
factor exceeding 1.7 effective December 2001. The federal budget envisaged a mechanism for
compensating regions for the additional expenses incurred due to the implementation of the
resolution, but the transfers from the federal center covered only about 10% of the cost.
The majority of municipalities cope with the task of paying the higher salaries at the expense of
the following:
?  lack of payment to organizations subsidized from regional and local budgets. There has
been a sharp increase in municipal accounts payable. For example, between November
2001 and March 2002 the arrears for municipal utility bills increased by nearly 4 billion
rubles, or 16 percent;
?  reduction of budgetary subsidies for housing and utilities.
?  reduction of other types of recurrent expenditures, including expenditures on
pharmaceuticals and construction materials;
?  reduction of funding for some federal mandates, especially for the mandates of Law on
Veterans;
?  sharp reduction of allocations for capital construction and major rehabilitation.
The share of costs for payment of salaries in 2002 is estimated to exceed 50% of a local budget
on average, while in some municipalities the share may exceed 80%. Consequently, as the result
complying with the “main federal mandate”, municipalities will lose development resources and
be unable to provide traditional public services at previously established levels.
One way to resolve the situation is the discontinuation of the most resource-consuming federal
mandate – tariff regulation of salaries. It also would make sense to review the vast array of
federal regulations and standards that guide these mandates.
Clearly, the federal center continues making decisions that seriously curtail the spending
autonomy of local governments. If local government is to have the fiscal flexibility to finance its
priorities, unfunded mandates must be limited.
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3.3. STRUCTURE OF MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURES
To evaluate changes in municipal expenditure policies and responsibilities in qualitative terms,
it is important to study the functional structure of municipal expenditures. Because of limited
historical data, the municipal expenditure data below were provided by the Fiscal Relations
Department of the RF Finance Ministry specifically for this investigation.
In 1996-2002, local budgets of expenditure were functionally structured as follows:
Table 13. Functional structure of local expenditure budgets in the Russian Federation
Expenditure items/years 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Expenditures, total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Local administration 3.3 4,3 5,3 5,7 6,0 6,5 6,7




8.3 6,6 7,0 6,3 5,7 10,5 9,9
Housing and communal services 26.6 27,0 30,3 27,4 28,9 24,6 19,5
Education 25.6 26,2 28,1 28,1 28,0 28,0 33,2
Culture, arts and cinema 2.1 2,1 2,3 2,5 2,8 2,6 3,0
Public health and fitness 14.5 14,5 15,0 15,8 16,0 14,9 15,5
Social policy 7.2 6,3 5,7 5,5 4,8 6,5 7,6
Other expenditures 12.4 13,0 8,6 8,7 7,8 6,4 4,6
Source: RF Ministry of Finance
Table 13 demonstrates a comparative stability of the municipal expenditure structure. The 1998
financial crisis had limited impact. Still, two important trends are worth pointing out. First, the
administration expenditures grew significantly over the six years period.
Second, from 1998 to 2001 local government housing and communal service expenditures
stabilized (when adjusting for changes in budget performance reporting rules) after rapid growth
from 1996 to 1998 due to the implementation of a new federal rent policy.
According to the federal standards, in 1998, individual users had to cover 50 percent of the cost of
housing and communal services, in 1999 – 60 percent, and in 2001 – 80 percent. In 2002, this
coverage is raised by the federal standard up to 90 percent. However, only a small number of
regions have all municipalities met this requirement.
Hence, Table 13 suggests that due to the ongoing successful implementation of the RF Government
program aimed at increasing the citizens’ role of paying for housing and communal service costs,
the structure of local expenditure budgets changed.
The inflexibility of allocating municipal expenditures over the last six years underscores the high
level of control over these expenditures. Municipalities do not have the flexibility to concentrate
allocate resources as they deem appropriate.
Using the data from 79 Russian cities, we can determine if the above-mentioned conclusion about
the stability of municipal government spending patterns is valid. The spending structure data
characterizing the selected cities in 1999 through 2001 is shown in Chart 2 and Table 14. Our
analysis shows that, municipal spending patterns remained constant from 1999 through 2001 in
major categories of municipal expenditures such as housing and utility complex (28% to 31% of the
total), education spending (26% to 27%) and health protection (16% to 18%) as well as in smaller
categories such as social purposes, transport and administration.
The share of spending on the branches of local economy (industrial, energy and construction
sectors) changed most significantly. In 2001, these spending items increased sharply because of
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changes in the accounting policy (capital investment in the housing and utility sector became

































Average spending structure in selected municipalities in 1999 through 2001
Table 14. Structure of local budget spending in Russia as a whole and in cities included in the
sample, 1999-2001
Spending item / Year Average for Russia as awhole:
Average for the sample:
1999 2000 2001 1999 2000 2001
TOTAL spending 100 100 100 100 100 100
Local self-government 5.7 6.0 6.5 4.2 4.7 5.1
Branches of economy (manufacturing,
energy sector, construction, agriculture,
transport, road building,
telecommunications and others)
6.3 5.7 10.5 6.6 5.0 8.6
Housing and utility sector 27.4 28.9 24.6 31.1 33.5 28.9
Education 28.1 28.0 28.0 27.7 26.6 26.2
Culture, arts and film production 2.5 2.8 2.6 1.2 1.4 1.4
Health protection and physical culture 15.8 16.0 14.9 18.2 18.3 16.3
Social policy 5.5 4.8 6.5 4.5 3.4 6.9
Other expenditures 8.7 7.8 6.4 6.5 7.1 6.6
Note: The data used were received from 67 municipalities in 1999, 48 municipalities in 2000 and 79 municipalities in
2001. Source of data for Russian as a whole form the Ministry of Finance
The structure of spending in different cities depends on a number of social and economic factors,
such as the population-age structure, characteristics of the housing stock, city-plan type and others.
Furthermore, we may hypothesize that a municipality’s ability to meet its budget priorities depends
on its budget strength. The greater the budget strength, the greater the opportunity to fund local
priorities in addition to priorities "induced" by higher levels of the budget system.
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Let us test this hypothesis using the housing and utility sector since it is the largest municipal
budget item. We examined the relationship between the share of spending on the housing and utility
sector and per capita budget revenues (budget strength). For analytical purposes, per capita budget
revenue figures are adjusted to reflect varying price levels among cities.
3.3.1. Analysis of Local Budget Spending on the Housing and Utility Sector (based on
the data from cities included in the sample)
If we assume that spending on the housing and utility sector is chronically underfinanced, then an
increase in municipal budget revenues should lead to an increase in housing and utility spending.
The relationship between these two parameters is shown in Chart 3. Contrary to our hypothesis,
Chart 3 shows a negative relationship between these two parameters. Excluding municipalities with
an extremely high budget strength (Norilsk, Surgut and Nizhnevartovsk) from the analysis reveals
positive, but statistically insignificant, relationship between the two parameters.































































Relationship between Share of Spending on the Housing and Utility Sector and Budget Strength
in 1999. (at the right are Norilsk, Surgut and Nizhnevartovsk, which are excluded)
Thus, our analysis shows that budget strength has little relation to spending on the percent of a
city’s budget expended in housing and utility complex. Other factors, such as the physical condition
of the housing stock, percent of private housing versus public housing, available housing, and share
of people whose income is lower than the subsistence minimum most likely influence city housing
sector investment decisions. However, reliable data characterizing such factors were unavailable.
3.3.2. Capital Investment from Local Budgets (an analysis based on the data from cities
included in the sample)
The share of capital investment in total spending of the cities under consideration remained stable
at about 11% from 1999 to 2001(See Table 15). However, the data presented in the table show a
large variance among individual cities.
Table 15. Differences in Shares of Capital Investment in Total Municipal Government Spending
in Different Cities in 1999 through 2001 (%)
33
Min. Max. Average Variationcoefficient
1999 3.1 35.1 11.1 0.613
2000 3.0 28.3 11.5 0.504
2001 1.1 45.1 11.6 0.638
All other conditions equal, the cities with large per capita budget revenues have more fiscal
flexibility to finance capital investment than cities with small per capita budget revenues.
Table 16. Relationship between Municipal Budgets' Strength and Share of Spending on Capital





coefficients 0.354 0.531 0.400




































































 Relationship between Municipal Budgets' Strength and Share of Spending on Capital
Investment in Spending Structure in 1999 and 2001 (Norilsk, Surgut and Nizhnevartovsk
excluded).
This observation is fully validated by the data presented in Table 16 and Chart 4. When cities with
large budget revenues are excluded from the analysis, there is a significant relationship between
budget strength and per capita capital investment. Thus, budget strength is a main factor
determining the levels of municipal capital investment.
The share of capital investment in total spending also may be determined by another important
financial indicator - the share of financial aid in a municipality's total budget revenues. In a number
of regions, inter-budgetary relations are determined by subjective factors. As a result, the regional
budget funds are frequently distributed between municipalities without taking into account
municipal budget strength and municipal governments' spending needs. At the same time, methods
of equalizing budget strength are used in a number of subjects of the Russian Federation (Republic
of Chuvashia, Tomsk Region, Stavropol Territory, Khanty-Mansi Autonomous District and others).
They provide for equal deductions from regional taxes for all local budgets. As a result, the share of
financial aid in the structure of municipal budget revenues increases.
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Taking into account these considerations, we can trace the relationship between the share of
financial aid (all kinds of transfers form the regional level) in municipal government revenues and
the share of capital investment in municipal government spending. Table 17 shows results of the
grouping of municipalities in accordance with these indicators in 2001.
Table 17. Grouping of Municipalities According to Share of Spending on Capital Investment and
Share of Transfers in their Budget Revenues in 20014
Share of Spending on Capital Investment, %
Share of transfers in
total revenues Less than 10% 10-15 More than 15%
Less than 10%
Angarsk, Balakovo, Veliki Novgorod,
Volzhski, Voronezh, Dzerzhinsk, Kaluga,










Bryansk, Vladimir, Kirov, Kostroma,























An analysis of the data presented in the table shows that an increased level of capital spending is, as
a rule, typical of cities that depend little on financial aid from regional budgets.
The data contained in the reports on budget execution do not allow us to analyze in detail all inter-
budgetary flows between the regional and city budgets in the subjects of the Russian Federation
under consideration. However, in a number of cases (Kazan, Makhachkala, Sochi) we can state that
budget equalization was hardly the purpose of the funds transfers that took place. Funds were
transferred to cities in the form of targeted subsidies provided specifically for capital investment
purposes.
3.4. REALLOCATION OF SOCIAL EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES
BETWEEN BUDGETS OF ALL LEVELS
To further evaluate changes in the structure of local expenditures for the past six years, one may
review the reallocation of spending responsibilities between state and local authorities. Table 18
below presents this dynamics.
Table 18. Regional and municipal contributions into the delivery of major public services based
on averaged indicators of their consolidated budgets (%, excluding Moscow and St Petersburg)
Expenditure






Housing and 15.0 85.0 12.0 88.0 10.1 89.9
                                               
4 During the interpretation of the data presented in this table, it should be taken into account that local budget revenue
generation patterns underwent significant qualitative changes in Russia in 2001. Local tax collection decreased, while
the share of financial aid from regional budgets (provided both through the application of "regulating" taxes or in the




Education 11.9 88.1 13.0 87.0 13.8 86.2
Culture and
arts 28.8 71.2 29.9 70.1 31.6 68.4
Public health
and fitness 25.7 74.3 27.8 72.2 32.0 68.0
Social
assistance 30.0 70.0 34.8 65.2 42.0 58.0
Expenditure









9.5 90.5 13.1 86.9 11.5 88.5
Education 15.0 85.0 15.9 84.1 18.2 81.8
Culture and
arts 35.1 64.9 31.9 68.1 33.9 66.1
Public health
and fitness 32.9 67.1 35.8 64.2 37.2 62.7
Social
assistance 42.8 57.2 52.0 48.0 52.1 47.9
Source: RF Ministry of Finance
Let us review the data shown in Table 18. From 1996 to 1999, municipal contributions to housing
and communal expenditures of regional consolidated budgets grew progressively. This was caused
by a diversity of factors. In the early 90s many regions provided subsidies for these services,
bypassing local budgets. In mid 90s there was extensive divestiture of enterprise housing to
municipalities with local governments taking over budgetary responsibility for these services.
In the last two years, the situation in the sector changed. Regional governments began assuming
responsibility for winterization and fuel supply costs of the sector thus increasing the regions’
contribution to the housing sector. Another factor increasing the region’s share in the housing
sector expenditures of consolidated regional budgets was the growing practice of payment of
housing allowances by  regional budgets (however, the role of this factor is not very large).
The last six years witnessed a comparative growth in the regions’ subsidizing of the education
sector. As a result, the contribution of local budgets in this sector fell from 88.1 percent in 1996 to
81.8 percent in 2001. This trend is caused by several factors. First, regional administrations are
owners of some educational institutions like specialized schools, technical colleges, etc. As a rule,
these institutions have a more prolific budget than municipal ones. There is also registered a steady
increase in regional capital investments in educational facilities.
Expenditures in the public health and fitness sector demonstrated a steady centralization trend all
over the six-year period. In culture and arts, the local and regional expenditures remained constant
between 1996 and 1999.
Regional governments also witnessed a steady growth in their social assistance expenditures mostly
due to the shift of the funding responsibility for specific federal mandates to the regional level.
The level of service provision also is affected by the financial condition of the municipality. Cities
with a productive tax base are capable funding the main types of functional expenditures.
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Financially weak municipalities require transfers from the regional budget to fund the necessary
expenditures.  In some cases, the financial authorities of Federation constituents took over some of
the spending responsibilities from municipalities. While this practice is somewhat counter the
Budget Code provisions, it resulted in improved financing of social expenditures.
Let us now analyze the distribution of spending on the main spending items between the regional
and local budgets. For the purposes of the analysis, we shall use the 2000 and 2001 data from the
Volga Federal District. These data are presented in Tables 19 and 20.
























Republic of Bashkortostan 34.2 66.0 17.6 82.0 48.0 52.0 35.0 65.0
Republic of Mari-El 8.0 92.0 23.0 77.0 42.0 58.0 29.0 71.0
Republic of Mordovia 6.0 94.0 17.0 83.0 35.0 65.0 39.0 61.0
Republic of Tatarstan 26.0 74.0 15.0 85.0 36.0 64.0 32.0 68.0
Republic of Udmurtia 13.0 87.0 10.0 90.0 34.0 66.0 32.0 68.0
Republic of Chuvashia 10.6 89.4 10.9 89.1 47.1 52.9 25.7 74.3
Kirov Region 5.0 95.0 7.0 93.0 21.0 79.0 27.0 73.0
Nizhni Novgorod Region 1.1 98.9 14.7 85.3 16.0 84.0 14.0 86.0
Orenburg Region 32.0 68.0 42.0 58.0 52.0 48.0 57.0 43.0
Penza Region 12.0 88.0 49.0 51.0 53.0 47.0 65.0 35.0
Perm Region 2.0 98.0 8.0 92.0 24.0 76.0 35.0 65.0
Komi-Permyatski
Autonomous District 11.0 89.0 11.0 89.0 29.0 71.0 42.0 58.0
Samara Region 8.1 91.9 38.0 62.0 38.0 62.0 80.0 20.0
Saratov Region 4.4 95.6 14.0 86.0 41.5 58.5 30.0 70.0
Ulyanovsk Region 17.0 83.0 24.0 76.0 59.0 41.0 48.0 52.0
Average for the Volga
Federal District 12.7 87.3 20.1 79.9 38.4 61.6 39.4 60.6
Source: the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance's reports on the execution of budgets of the subjects of the Russian
Federation and local budgets as of January 1, 2001.
























Republic of Bashkortostan 2.6 98.0 10.8 89.0 32.0 68.0 27.0 73.0
Republic of Mari-El 1.0 99.0 17.0 83.0 42.0 58.0 31.0 69.0
Republic of Mordovia 11.0 89.0 22.0 78.0 51.0 49.0 36.0 64.0
Republic of Tatarstan 5.0 95.0 9.0 91.0 41.0 59.0 28.0 72.0
Republic of Udmurtia 4.4 95.6 7.0 93.0 23.0 77.0 28.0 72.0
Republic of Chuvashia 27.0 73.0 13.0 87.0 32.0 68.0 33.0 67.0
Kirov Region 4.6 95.4 6.0 94.0 19.0 81.0 27.0 73.0
Nizhni Novgorod Region 1.0 99.0 15.0 85.0 18.0 82.0 14.0 86.0
Orenburg Region 1.1 98.9 8.0 92.0 27.0 73.0 54.0 46.0
Penza Region 9.7 90.3 45.0 55.0 54.0 46.0 67.0 33.0
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Perm Region 2.0 98.0 8.0 92.0 25.0 75.0 28.0 72.0
Komi-Permyatski
Autonomous District 100.0 0.0 13.0 87.0 32.0 68.0 56.0 44.0
Samara Region 5.0 95.0 42.0 58.0 28.0 72.0 80.0 20.0
Saratov Region 5.0 95.0 16.0 84.0 42.0 58.0 33.0 67.0
Ulyanovsk Region 48.5 51.5 20.0 80.0 48.0 52.0 45.0 55.0
Average for the Volga
Federal District 15.2 84.8 16.8 83.2 34.3 65.7 39.1 60.9
Source: the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance's reports on the execution of budgets of the subjects of the Russian
Federation and local budgets as of January 1, 2002.
The data presented in Tables 19 and 20 reflect a diversity of models of inter-budgetary relations in
Russia's regions. According to budget authority in the housing and utility sector, the regions
selected can be divided into two groups. The first group includes Samara, Saratov and Nizhni
Novgorod Regions and the Republics of Mari-El and Mordovia. In these regions, nearly all costs of
the housing and utility sector are covered by municipal governments. In Ulyanovsk Region, Komi-
Permyatski Autonomous District (in 2001) and the Republic of Chuvashia, a significant part of the
housing and utility sector's costs are covered by regional budgets.
The comparison of the data presented in Tables 19 and 20 with the data in Table 20 shows that
there are significant deviations from average indicators in the distribution of budget authority in the
regions under consideration. This, in its turn, testifies to a diversity of budget authority distribution
systems in these regions, which is quite normal for a federated state.
The juxtaposition of the data presented in Tables 19 and 20 shows that the distribution of some
spending obligations between the regional and local governments changed significantly in 2001.
This is especially true of the Komi-Permyatski Autonomous District, in which spending
responsibilities for the housing and utility complex were transferred to the regional governments,
while in the Republics of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Udmurtia, the spending role of local budgets
increased in all sectors.
As in the above-described cases, we can try to explain spending proportion differences between the
regional and local budgets by the strength of the regional budget. In order to take into account
differences in price levels in different regions regional per capita budget revenues were adjusted for
the cost of the consumer basket in these regions. The statistical relationship between per capita
revenues of the consolidated budgets of subjects of the Russian Federation and the regional budget's
share in total spending is shown in Table 21.
Table 21. Relationship between Budget Strength of Regions of the Volga Federal District and
Share of Regional Budgets in the Financing of Some Spending Items in 2000 through 2001
Share of regional budgets in the financing of spending on:Strength of the Regional
Budget Housing and UtilitySector Education Health protection Culture
2000 0.578 -0.181 -0.087 -0.061
2001 0.148 -0.326 -0.148 -0.040
The data in the table suggests that the share of regional budgets in spending on the housing and
utility complex grows as strength of the budgets of subjects of the Russian Federation increases.
This trend was visible especially clearly in 2000. In case of education spending, the relationship is
reverse: in regions with a high level of per capita budget revenues education spending is financed at
the local level. The relationship between shares of spending on health protection and culture and
budget strength is weak. It is indicative that, in cases of social spending, the correlation coefficients
are negative. Due to this we may assert that there is now shift in financing obligations towards the
local level in regions with a high level of per capita budget revenues.
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WINDOW 4. GROUPING OF MUNICIPALITIES ACCORDING TO TYPES OF BUDGET
POLICY
An analysis of budget policy is one of the most interesting parts of our analysis. A city’s budgetary
policy is reflected in its spending pattern over time. Based on the above hypothesis, we may assume
that city budget strength is one of the factors that determine the structure of city government
spending.
In order to identify municipalities with similar spending structures, we carried out a cluster analysis
of budget-execution report data for 1999 and 2000. Since the inclusion of a large number of
parameters makes cluster interpretation rather difficult, it is appropriate to use only two large
spending items, spending on the housing and utility sector and education.
An iteration analysis carried out within the frameworks of the cluster analysis shows that the
number of groups is close to 3 or 4. We divided municipalities into 4 groups based on their
spending levels for on the housing and utility sector and education.
Results of the cluster analysis are presented in Tables 22 and 23. Average budget strength figures
for each group are presented as additional information. In order to take into account regional
differences in price levels, the latter indicator was adjusted for the subsistence minimum in the
region, in which a particular municipality is located.
Table 22. Municipality Clusters Determined According to Shares of Spending on the Housing and
Utility Sector and Education in Total Spending, 1999
Clusters
1 2 3 4
Housing and Utility Sector 0.27 0.31 0.17 0.40
Education 0.23 0.31 0.39 0.24
For reference:
Budget Strength, rubles 2823 2105 1946 2403
Cluster
1
Vologda, Kemerovo, Kurgan, Taganrog, Cherepovets, Balakovo, Bratsk,
Volgograd, Irkutsk, Kazan, Kaluga, Lipetsk, Saransk, Sterlitamak, Ufa
2
Angarsk, Arkhangelsk, Astrakhan, Bryansk, Volzhski, Yekaterinburg,
Izhevsk, Yoshkar-Ola, Kirov, Kostroma, Nizhni Tagil, Orel, Penza,
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski, Pskov, Samara, Smolensk, Syktyvkar, Tambov,
Tver, Tyumen, Cheboksary
3
Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Naberezhnye Chelny, Nizhnekamsk, Severodvinsk,
Khabarovsk, Chita
4
Blagoveshchensk, Omsk, Perm, Ryazan, Tolyatti, Tula, Ulyanovsk, Shakhty,
Engels, Vladikavkaz, Tomsk, Veliki Novgorod, Kaliningrad, Krasnoyarsk,
Makhachkala, Murmansk, Novokuznetsk, Novosibirsk, Saratov, Ulan-Ude
Table 23. Municipality Clusters Determined According to Shares of Spending on the Housing and
Utility Sector and Education in Total Spending, 2000
Clusters
1 2 3 4
Housing and Utility Sector 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.19
Education 0.27 0.26 0.19 0.33
For reference:




Angarsk, Astrakhan, Balakovo, Bratsk, Bryansk, Volgograd, Yekaterinburg,
Irkutsk, Kazan, Kostroma, Nalchik, Orenburg, Sterlitamak, Taganrog,
Tambov, Tyumen, Ufa, Cheboksary, Shakhty
2
Blagoveshchensk, Vladimir, Volzhski, Vologda, Voronezh, Kirov,
Krasnoyarsk, Nizhni Tagil, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski, Pskov, Samara,
Syktyvkar, Tver, Tolyatti, Tomsk, Ulyanovsk, Cherepovets, Engels
3 Vladivostok, Kaliningrad, Saratov, Ulan-Ude
4
Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Naberezhnye Chelny, Nizhnekamsk, Omsk,
Khabarovsk, Chita
Based on the calculations conducted, we can identify the following groups of cities:
The first group includes Angarsk, Astrakhan, Balakovo, Bryansk, Yekaterinburg and Volgograd.
The shares of spending on the housing and utility sector and education in total spending were
approximately equal (about 30%) in these cities. The strength of city budgets was close to the
average figure in this group, the share of transfers in total budget revenues varied from 10% to
12%, while capital investment accounted for about 10% of total spending.
The second group consists of cities with the largest share of spending on the housing and utility
sector (up to 50%) and average spending on education (about 25%). This cluster includes
Blagoveshchensk, Volzhski, Saratov, Ulan-Ude, Syktyvkar and Vladivostok. The average city
budget strength in this group is below the average level in the sample. As a result, most municipal
governments are dependent on the regional budgets. The share of non-repayable transfers tended to
increase, reaching 18% in 2000 (the maximum for the sample was 45% in Ulan-Ude). The shares of
capital investment in total spending varied significantly in this group, with the average level at 7%
to 7.5%.
The third group includes Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Naberezhnye Chelny, Nizhnekamsk, Khabarovsk
and Chita. Education spending accounts for the largest share in the spending structure of these
municipalities (the three-year average is larger than 30%). At the same time, spending on the
housing and utility sector was the lowest in the sample (17% to 20%). Of all the cities belonging to
this group, Nizhnekamsk is characterized by the highest level of budget strength. But the average
level of per capita budget income in this group was the lowest in the sample.
The group with average education spending (23% to 25%) and above-average spending on the
housing and utility sector (27% to 30%) includes Vologda, Cherepovets, Bratsk, Irkutsk, Kazan,
Kaluga, Lipetsk, Sterlitamak and Ufa. Despite a significant variance of budget strength indicators,
the group is characterized by a significant level of budget strength. This cluster includes
municipalities that are ‘donors’ in their regions and have a high economic potential (metallurgical
and petrochemical industries). The share of transfers from the regional budgets never exceeds 7%
to 8% of city budget revenues. Significant budget revenues of these municipalities make it possible
for them to allot a significant part of their funds for capital investment. During the period under
review, the share of capital spending in their total spending never decreased below 15% or 18%.
Thus, summarizing the results of the cluster analysis, we can conclude that there is a group of
municipalities whose spending patterns are rather stable in time. The analysis also revealed a
relationship between the type of spending policy and strength of the city budget. However, a more
thorough investigation of reasons behind differences in municipal government spending patterns
will require additional statistical data.
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3.5 MUNICIPAL ACCOUNTS PAYABLE
When reviewing municipal expenditures and practice, one also focuses on problem of municipal
accounts payable and receivable.  By the beginning of March 2002 the net arrears on accounts
payable of the budgetary organizations funded by the regional and local budgets on communal
services totaled 24 billion rubles, while the total net amount of arrears on accounts payable
exceeded 80 billion rubles. This statement is illustrated for the case of the regions of Volga
Federal District (see Table 24).
Table 24. Distribution of arrears on communal services between regional and local budgets in
Russia and PFO in 2000 (%)
Share of arrears
Region Regional budget Municipalbudgets
Total for Russia 12 88
Mordovia Republic 1 99
Ulianovskaya Oblast 2 98
Chuvashskaya Republic 2 98
Tatarstan Republic 2 98
Saratovskaya Oblast 3 97
Komi-Permyatsky Okrug 3 97
Permskaya Oblast 4 96
Orenburgskaya Oblast 4 96
Kirovskaya Oblast 6 94
Bashkortostan Republic 9 91
Udmurtskaya Republic 10 90
Nizhegorodskaya Oblast 10 90
Samarskaya Oblast 12 88
Penzenskaya Oblast 17 83
Mary El Republic 19 81
Source: RF Ministry of Finance
Local governments, which are overloaded with mandated spending responsibilities, lack sufficient
revenues to pay providers of utilities, services and other products.
Accounts payable on communal services do not reflect the full scale of the problem of arrears in
the sector.  The failure of local budgets to pay in full for the utilities supplied to the budgetary
organizations by the providers of communal services makes the latter unprofitable.  While in 1992
the percent of unprofitable utility providers was 33.5%, in 2000, their share reached 61.1%.  There
is nothing comparable to this phenomenon in any other sector.  Typically, these communal service
enterprises are established as municipal unitary enterprises (MUP).  They incur losses and delay
payment of salaries to their workers, depriving their municipalities of considerable tax revenues. In
addition, they continue to increase their arrears due to power producers.
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Recent management reform undertaken by the RAO UES (Russian joint-stock company of energy
and electricity). has resulted in regional RAO structures now reporting to the central office of RAO
UES.  This development enhanced the ability of RAO UES to impose stringent payment discipline
on non-payers by restricting their power supply. For example, in June 2002, water was not
supplied to a housing sector of the third biggest city in Russia – Nizhny Novgorod because of local
government arrears.
Thus, this chapter suggests three main conclusions:
?  The structure of municipal expenditure budgets has been stable over time because it is
mostly regulated by the federal and regional governments This conclusion is also confirmed
by the analysis of data from 79 Russian cities;
?  Municipal housing sector expenditures have begun to trend downward due to sector
reforms;
?  In key social sectors – education, culture and art, and public health – the centralization trend
in expenditures was recorded from 1997 to 2001;
?  The expenditure autonomy of municipalities has become more limited due to unfunded
mandates;
?  The share of municipal spending on the housing and utility sector does not depend on the
municipal budget strength;
?  The strength of the budget determines the economic structure spending from the city
budget;
?  The example of the regions of Volga Federal District shows that the improvement of the
budget strength of subjects of the Russian Federation does not result in the shift in the
financing of the consolidated budget's social sector spending items to regional budgets. On
the contrary, there is a trend towards centralization of spending on the housing and utility
sector in richer regions.
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4. MUNICIPAL BORROWINGS AND BUDGET DEFICIT
4.1 REFORMS IN THE 90S
In the early 90s, municipalities borrowed from regional budgets  to cover revenue shortfalls.  In
the mid 90s, a series of laws were enacted that established rather liberal borrowing rules for
subfederal budgets. These laws, which were later revoked, authorized municipalities to issue of
municipal bonds and lottery tickets, extend and take loans, and open municipal accounts with
banks and other financial and credit institutions. However, neither the upper limit nor the
purposes of borrowings were set in this law.
In this environment, municipalities actively issued municipal bonds and sought bank loans.
However, even at their peak in 1996, municipal securities played a rather insignificant role in
the market. This was a result of the emergence, in 1995, of risk free state securities, which were
used as the main instrument for accumulating most of the uncommitted resources available in
the country.
The lack of regulation on the volume and purpose of regional and municipal debt obligations
had a very adverse impact. Municipalities borrowed money for current needs, at unfavorable
terms, and had insufficient fund for debt repayment.
Clearly there was a need for some form of regulation. In 1996, the federal law On Securities
Market obligated issuers of securities to register every issue with the Federal Securities
Commission. In 1997, the federal law On Financial Fundamentals of Local Self Governance
limited a municipality’s debt obligations to no more than 15 percent of their budgetary
expenditures. Furthermore, municipal bonds could be issued solely for implementing various
municipal development programs and projects. This provision makes no mention of capital
investments. Moreover, the law did not regulate the use of bank loans by municipalities.
In 1995 – 1996, the practice of issuing promissory notes became popular among regions and
municipalities. Promissory notes did not need registration. They were issued to contractors and
other regional and municipal creditors without bank guarantees. With limited regional and
municipal fiscal flexibility, promissory notes were considered a convenient money surrogate.
Issuance, circulation and retirement of regional and municipal promissory notes were not
subject to strict regulation. When, and if, these promissory notes were retired, it was at the
expense of budgetary funds.
Due to local and regional excesses in using such instruments, the law On Simple and Transfer
Bills of Exchange (Promissory Notes) was passed in 1997 disallowing regional and municipal
governments to issue promissory notes. This law had little effect on regions and municipalities,
which continued to use various setoff schemes based on promissory notes now issued by banks
and enterprises. Finally, the practice came to end because of the 1998 financial crisis that gave
impetus to monetize the national economy.
4.2 BUDGET CODE RESTRICTIONS DEBT FINANCE PRACTICES
At present, the main legal document that governs municipal debt policy is the Budget Code.
Adopted in 1998, the Budget Code, as amended, disallows municipalities and Federation
Subjects to use external loans. Debt obligations of municipalities cannot exceed 10 years.
Additionally, the Budget Code provides several other quantitative and qualitative restrictions on
debt policy options and purposes. Quantitative restrictions include:
?  The total of municipal debt obligations cannot exceed the volume of budgetary revenues
minus transfers made from other budgets.
?  The fiscal year budget approved by the local legislature cannot have a deficit exceeding
10 percent of budgetary revenues minus transfers made from other budgets.
?  Municipal debt service cannot exceed 15 percent of the total budget.
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?  Municipalities receiving financial aid from upper-level budgets cannot issue guarantees
exceeding 5 percent of their budgetary expenditures.
Qualitative restrictions on municipal debt policy include the requirement that current
expenditures of a local budget cannot exceed its total revenue budget approved by local
legislative authorities. Implicitly that means that municipalities  (and RF Subjects) can issue
debt obligations only for financing their capital expenditures.
In accordance with the Budget Code, municipal financial departments must keep a register of
municipal debt obligations including: the amount of debt and municipal guarantees; date of
issuance; forms of security, and amount repaid. The Code also obligates municipalities to have a
register of debt obligations of municipal unitary enterprises. These provisions of the Budget
Code are commonly violated by local governments (partly because many municipalities use
only short term loans from regional budgets).
The Budget Code restrictions on municipal debt policy are complemented with restrictions in
the federal law On Specificity in Issuance and Circulation of State and Municipal Securities.
According to this law, debt obligations (including municipal bonds) may not be registered if the
issuer “violates provisions of the RF budget law”. This suggests that municipalities violating
these provisions will be prohibited from issuing municipal bonds.
These restrictions placed on the issuance of municipal debt obligations have certain
inadequacies, as described below.
Budget deficit limitation. Typically, public infrastructure projects require significant investment.
Accordingly, the budget deficit limitation hinders a municipality’s ability to use debt to finance
large investment projects (which is now a very rare case).
Note this limitation is not imposed on guarantees issued by Federation Subjects or
municipalities to secure debt obligations of third parties. According to the Budget Code,
municipal guarantees are a specific type of debt obligations, which are to be included into the
total state (municipal) debt. Moreover, guarantees cannot be treated as a source of budget deficit
financing, because it is generally assumed that this type of debt obligations is used for covering
costs of the end borrower rather than cost of a regional/municipal administration. However,
occasionally administrations may use guarantees as a form of hidden bank loans.5
Loan purpose limitation. Despite the existing requirement to balance current expenditures with
budgetary revenues, local administrations continue to borrow for operating costs. Often the
federal government itself instigates administrations to violate this requirement. As noted earlier,
the introduction of new standard wage rates forced municipalities to substantially reduce their
capital investments and resort to borrowing to pay employee wages.
For example, the revenue budget of Nizhny Novgorod City for 2002 initially included a transfer
from the regional budget to cover the increase in the public sector wages. However, this transfer
was not made and the city resorted to borrowing to cover this budget gap.
While there are many other examples of violating the standards imposed by the Budget Code,
municipalities exhibit a number of weaknesses in their debt policy and management practices.
These include:
Lack of a unified debt strategy. Most Russian municipalities have no practice of developing
long-term financial plans and, hence, have no long-term investment program or debt policy.
This situation is further hindered by the financial markets, which do not offer long-term loans to
municipalities.
                                               
5 In that case, an administration just knows beforehand that an end borrower will not be able to fulfill its debt
obligations.
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Lack of criteria to assess the effectiveness of the use of borrowed resources. Evaluation and
performance measurement criteria to assess the effectiveness of the use of budgetary resources,
including debt obligations, are lacking at all levels of the Russian budgetary system.
WINDOW 3. INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL BORROWINGS
In international practice, there are a variety of indicators used to assess municipal credit quality
(see, for example, Standard & Poor’s, 2002). One of the key indicators is the ratio of municipal
debt to total revenues. This ratio is used by rating agencies, municipalities and national
governments to assess municipal credit risks, develop debt strategies, and control municipal debt
obligations. It is an indicator for evaluating the municipality’s capacity to service its debt from
its own resources. In the USA, for example, a debt to total revenues ratio above 0.15 percent is
usually considered as an alarming indicator. Another quantitative indicator used for weighting
the debt burden is the ratio between the total municipal debt and the total value of private
property, which is indicative of the size of the municipal property tax base.
4.3 LOCAL BUDGET DEFICIT / SURPLUS IN 1996 – 2001
The paper will now review local budget deficits and the finance sources used to close these
deficits. Table 25 below shows the extent of local budget deficit from 1996 to 2001 and the
structure of budget gap financing.
Table 25. Local budget deficit (trillions of rubles in 1996/1997; billions of rubles in other
years)
Budget lines/years 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Total revenues 218.1 269.3 239.9 324.2 454.1 561.4
Total expenditures 223.5 283.0 243.1 323.8 460.6 576.5
Deficit/surplus -5.4 -13.7 -3.2 0.4 -6.5 -15.2
Source of finance
Balance of
budgetary account 2.2 2.8 0.4 -5.2 -10.5 3.1
Securities 0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 0.4 0.0
Budget loans 0.0 0.0 -0.5 2.9 13.6 7.8
Bank loans N/a N/a N/a N/a 1.0 1.6
Other sources N/a N/a N/a N/a 4.5 2.7
Source: RF Ministry of Finance Note: Other sources include revenues from sale of municipal property and other
revenues
The Finance Ministry statistics fail to provide a clear view of the structure of the municipal budget
gap finance over the last six years. Nevertheless, data shown in Table 25 provide the basis for
making certain conclusions. In this period, securities did not play a significant role in financing
municipal budget gaps. From the data presented, the issuance of municipal securities peaked in
1996. In 1997, the issuance of municipal bonds was reduced significantly. In 1998 and 1999,
municipalities were mostly concerned with repayment of their security debts, and started making
new “net” borrowings only in 2000, but the size of these borrowings was insignificant.
In 1999 municipalities were able to reduce their budget debts in part due to: a) a favorable
economic environment in Russian; and, b) a depreciation of the ruble causing a reduction in wage
and utility subsidy obligations, Many municipalities closed their fiscal year with a surplus.
In 2000 – 2001, municipalities’ expenditures were greater than their revenues. However,
municipalities did not enter the bond market and relied mostly on budget loans. Note, bank loans,
which municipalities usually take to cover their cash gaps, were repaid during the year and thus are
not reflected in table.
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For the purposes of comparison, let use review sources of finance that regional governments use to
cover their budget deficit.
Table 26. Regional budget deficit (trillions of rubles in 1996/1997; billions of rubles in other
years)
Budget lines/years 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Total revenues 195.9 258.6 243.8 397.2 704.4 918.1
Total expenditures 207.1 279.9 249.8 390.6 677.7 909.2
Deficit/surplus -11.1 -21.3 -5.9 6.6 26.7 8.9
Source of finance
Balance of
budgetary account 4.6 7.0 0.3 -6.8 -10.2 -5.7
Securities 3.7 6.0 -0.3 -2.0 -2.3 6.7
Budget loans 1.4 14.3 -3.2 -5.1 -2.2 4.0
Bank loans N/a N/a N/a N/a 0.4 -12.0
Other sources N/a N/a N/a N/a -14.3 -1.9
Source: RF Ministry of Finance
From Table 26, it is evident that regions have a more developed system of debt finance than
municipalities. This may be explained in part because Moscow and St. Petersburg are considered
regions.
From 1996 to 1997, regions made extensive use of loans. In 1996, they raised 3.7 billion rubles,
and in 1997, 6 billion rubles (in current prices). In 1998, they stopped using loans to raise funds.
Finally, from 1999 to 2001, regions were mostly concerned with repayment of their debts.
The general statistics on regional debt are significantly affected by Moscow and St. Petersburg.
For example, removing their data from the statistics for 2001, the picture looks quite different.
Table 27 shows budget deficit data for Moscow, St. Petersburg and other Russian regions for 2001.
Table 27. Regional budget deficit in 2001 (billions of rubles)
Budget lines/years Moscow St. Petersburg Other regions
Total revenues 232.7 50.1 635.3
Total expenditures 223.8 47.8 637.6
Deficit/surplus 8.9 2.3 -2.3
Source of finance
Balance of budgetary account -3.9 -0.2 -2.7
Securities 5.3 1.5 -0.1
Budget loans 0.2 0.0 3.8
Bank loans -14.2 0.5 1.7
Source: RF Ministry of Finance
Table 27 demonstrates that, in 2001, Moscow and St. Petersburg were the most important
borrowers on the state securities market. Other regions were chiefly repaying their debt on
previously issued securities. Apparently, the negative consequences of the financial crisis are
still in effect. However, in 2001 Russian regions (except two of them) again, as before the
financial crisis, closed the year with a deficit that was covered through budget and bank loans.
Conclusions of this Chapter are as follows:
First, the system of debt finance is more developed at the regional rather than at the local level
although municipalities’ and regions’ needs in loans are, at least for now, similar.
Second, Moscow and St. Petersburg dominate the regional loan market, particularly, on the
regional securities market where the presence of other regions is negligible.
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5. SCENARIO CALCULATIONS FOR THE BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE
ENACTMENT OF THE DRAFT LAW “ON THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE
ORGANIZATION OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNANCE IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION”
The first four chapters of this analytical report focused on Russian municipal finance trends over
the past decade. On January 4, 2003, the President of the Russian Federation introduced the draft
law “On the General Principles of the Organization of Local Self-Governance in the Russian
Federation” to the State Duma. This chapter will focus on the possible re-distribution of funds
between various levels of the budget system resulting from the reforms stipulated by the draft law.
The following goals were set:
1. To evaluate whether the adoption of the above draft law will result in decentralization of
revenue and expenditure powers to the local level and increase budget independence of
local self-governments.
2. To evaluate the existing imbalance between expense obligations and financial means
available at the local budget level to meet these obligations.
This evaluation will demonstrate what kind of re-distribution of financial resources between the
levels of the budget system is necessary to strengthen local budgets, which is one of the conditions
of successful implementation of this draft law.
Calculations are based on the data of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation on budget
performance of the subjects of the Russian Federation and local budgets, placed on the Ministry’s
website (www.minfin.ru/ispSub/2002/09/Mes0.html). The data for 12 months of 2002 were used
for calculations of the distribution of financial resources between the functional sections of budget
classification.
Calculations of different scenarios are based on the following provisions and hypotheses:
1. The government functions will be divided between local self-government and regional state
authorities in accordance with the draft law provisions.
2. Local self-governments will continue to exercise the same state powers they are entrusted
with today (housing and utility, transportation and social policy sectors). They also will be
entrusted with the performance of certain new state powers, which are now considered as
local issues that will be viewed as issues of regional significance (provision of housing
allowances, financing of education process).
3. The transferred state powers will be financed by means of subventions from federal, or
regional, budgets provided to municipalities for execution of state powers.
4. Total volume of local budgets will not change, i.e. the funds will be re-distributed between
various special-purpose budget items and types of expenditures, as well as between revenue
types and items (this provision is relevant for Scenarios I and II).
Three possible scenarios of future developments were calculated. They differ by the following
assumptions:
Scenario I – is based on the assumption that “old” as well as “new” state powers will be financed at
present levels.
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Scenario II – is based on the assumption that all state powers transferred to local self-governments
will be financed in full, as stipulated by the federal legislation. At the same time, the volume of
state powers will not be reduced, and the volume of local budgets will not be increased.
Scenario III – is based on the assumption of Scenario II, but on condition that local budget volume
will be increased appropriately in order to finance the transferred state powers in full in accordance
with federal laws.
Results of the scenario calculations are presented in Table 28.
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Table 28. Scenario calculation of the implications of the enactment of the law “On the General
Principles of the Organization of Local Self-Governance in the Russian Federation”
 
Initial
scenario Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III
 
Expenditures total, including 728,3 728,3 728,3 807,0
State powers (estimate),
including 78,6 280,6 359,3 359,3
Housing and utilities 22,86 30,97 53,78 53,7
Transportation 9,09 9,0 30,010 30,0
Social policy 46,811 52,312 87,213 87,2
Education 0 188,414 188,4 188,4
Municipal budget own
expenditures 649,7 447,7 369,0 447,7
Total revenues, including 707,8 707,8 707,8 786,5
Tax revenues including 379,0 213,5 134,8 213,5
Regulated tax revenues15 248,1 0,0 0,0 0,0
Own tax revenues 130,9 213,5 134,8 213,5
Non-repayable transfers,
including 283,8 449,3 528,0 528,0
Subsidies 72,3 72,3 72,3 72,3
Subventions for exercising
state powers 64,3 280,6 359,3 359,3
Mutual settlements 24,9 0,0 0,0 0,0
Subsidies for equalization 96,4 96,4 96,4 96,4
Grants 25,8 0,0 0,0 0,0
Non-tax revenues 45,0 45,0 45,0 45,0
Deficit 20,5 20,5 20,5 20,5
The Initial Scenario (see Table 28), which reflects local budget activity in 2002, presents those
expenditures that are in essence state powers, as they are “imposed” by decisions made at federal
and regional level (e.g., federal and regional mandates).
                                               
6 Expenditures for housing and utility payment benefits
7 Expenditures for housing and utility payment benefits and housing allowance
8 100% financing of state powers associated with housing and utility expenditures (only 50% of housing and utility payment benefits are currently
financed ).
9 95% of local budget expenses for transportation
10 Only 30% of federal transportation mandates are currently financed.
11 85% of local budget expenses for social policy.
12 95% of local budget expenses for social policy
13 Only 60% of federal social policy mandates are currently financed.
14 80% of local budget expenses for education (financing of education process).
15 Pursuant to the Draft Law, regulated tax revenues will be included into the municipal budget own tax revenues, as they will be permanently
assigned to the local budget level.
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Main social policy expenses of municipalities are now associated with exercising state powers.
These expenses include child allowances, funds allocated pursuant to federal laws “On Veterans”,
“On Social Protection of the Disabled”, “On Status of the Military”, “On Social Services to the
Population”, “On Social Services to Elderly and Disabled Citizens” and a number of other federal
laws.
Calculations demonstrate that about 85% of municipalities’ expenses for social policy are
associated with exercising state powers.
Surveys conducted in a number of Russian cities show that 95% of local budget transportation
expenses are associated with the provision of benefits to various categories of population in
accordance with federal legislation.
Housing and utility expenses of local budgets include housing allowances, which are also stipulated
by federal laws, and, according to current data of Gosstroy of Russia (the Russian Ministry for
Construction), comprise about 16% of local budget expenses for the housing and utility sector.
Everything else can be considered as “own expenses of municipalities” for addressing local issues.
It must be noted that many expenses for local issues are now determined by the decisions made at
the federal and regional level (e.g., salary amounts of employees of municipal organizations).
However, these unfunded federal and regional mandates, although presenting a negative influence
and decreasing financial independence of municipalities, can hardly be viewed as state powers
exercised by local self-governments.
The expenditures listed above, equaling 78.6 billion rubles, are considered expenditures for
exercising state powers. Subventions totaling 64.6 billion rubles were transferred to the budgets of
municipalities in order to finance these state powers.
As of today, the share of local budget expenditures for exercising state powers equals 11%, while
municipal budget own expenses for addressing local issues equals 89% (see Table 29).
Table 29. Indicators for Analysis (%)
Indicators
Initial
Scenario Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III
Share of expenditures for state powers 10,8 38,5 49,3 44,5
Share of municipal budget own expenses 89,2 61,5 50,7 55,5
Municipal budget own expenses (in % of
Initial Scenario) 100,0 68,9 56,8 68,9
Share of municipal budget own revenues in
total revenues 16 24,9 60,4 49,2 54,3
Share of own tax revenues and non-tax
revenues in total revenues 24,9 36,5 25,4 32,9
Share of subventions in total revenues 9,1 39,6 50,8 45,7
Revenues (in % of Initial Scenario) 100,0 100,0 100,0 111,1
                                               
16 According to Article 55 of the Draft Law, municipal budget own revenues are formed with tax and non-tax revenues
of local budgets, subsidies for budget equalization, other means of financial assistance from budgets of other levels. For
the Initial Scenario, the share of municipal budget own revenues in total revenues is calculated on the basis of definition
provided by the Budget Code, while for the Scenarios I, II and II the definition given by the Draft Law
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According to our expert evaluation, the total volume of state obligations in connection with
provision of housing and utility, transportation and social protection benefits, stipulated by federal
legislation, comes to about 145 billion rubles a year, less than 50% the financing required. At the
same time, numerous attempts to cancel unfunded benefits and programs have not succeeded so far.
The draft law calls for the mechanism of financing state powers assigned to local self-governments
by providing subventions from the federal or regional budgets and suspending the action of
corresponding laws inasmuch as such subventions are not provided. This mechanism will
undoubtedly ensure better financial stability of the local budgets. The main question is: how will
this financial stability be achieved: by way of reducing local self-governments own expenditures or
by way of redistributing a part of consolidated budget revenues in favor of local budgets?
Scenario I simulates the situation of the enactment of the draft law. Pursuant to its provisions, the
volume of state powers will change from the Initial Scenario. Expenses for providing housing
allowances will be included into the expenditures for performance of state powers associated with
the housing and utility sector.
As far as social policy sector is concerned, 95% of current municipal expenditures can be
considered as state powers.
State powers will also include expenses for “financing of education process” within the limits of
providing pre-school, primary general, basic general, secondary (full) general education, as well as
additional education. According to expert evaluation, these expenses equal 80% of current local
budget expenses for education.
As a result of these changes, expenditures for exercising state powers will increase up to 281 billion
rubles. Pursuant to the draft law, the funds for financing the assigned state powers will be
transferred to the local budgets in the form of subventions from the federal or regional budgets.
Consequently, the subventions will also increase up to 281 billion rubles. Under this scenario, it is
assumed that the subventions will be increased by way of reducing other types of non-refundable
transfers (except subsidies for budget equalization and other subsidies) and tax revenues of local
budgets. Expenses for exercising municipal own powers will be reduced from some 650 to 448
billion rubles.
Thus, municipal budget own expenditures will equal 69% of the current level and their share in
total expenditures will be reduced from 89.2% to 61.5%. The share of expenditures for exercising
state powers will increase to 38.5% of total expenditures.
This Scenario incorporates the proposals of the draft law on assigning a part of regulated federal
and regional taxes to local budgets on a permanent basis. As a result, own tax and non-tax revenues
of local budgets will increase up to 36.5% of the total revenues, while they currently equal 25%.
Scenario II is based on the assumption that due to political considerations and the draft law
requirement to finance the state powers by way of subventions, federal and regional state
authorities will try to finance the state powers assigned to the local level in full. According to our
expert evaluation, only 50% of the need in housing and utility payment benefits is currently
financed. The level of financing federal transportation mandates equals 30%. The level of financing
federal social policy mandates currently equals 60%.
Financing of all state powers in full will require 359 billion rubles, 79 billion rubles more than is
needed under Scenario I. For this, subventions will be increase by 28%, while own tax revenues
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will be reduced by 37%. Under this Scenario, the share of municipal budget own tax and non-tax
revenues comes to 25%, which roughly equals the current share.
As a result, the share of expenditures for exercising state powers will be increased up to 49% by
way of reducing the expenditures for performance of municipal own powers by 18%.
Therefore, Scenario III is based on the assumption that for local governments to meet 100% of the
financing requirements to implement state powers, additional funds will be transferred to municipal
budgets from other levels of the budget system in order not to reduce municipal budget own
expenditures for addressing local issues.
Municipal budget own expenditures will remain at the level of Scenario I – 448 billion rubles,
while municipal budge total expenditures will increase by 78 billion to 807 billion rubles in order to
finance 100% of state powers.
Under this scenario, the share of municipal budget own expenditures will equal 55%, while the
share of expenditures for performance of state powers will equal 45%. The share of municipal
budget own tax and non-tax revenues will increase by 33%, compared to the current level.
Thus, based on the analysis of the current situation of local budgets and an examination of possible
scenarios after the enactment of the draft law “On the General Principles of the Organization of
Local Self-Governance in the Russian Federation”, we arrive at the following conclusions:
1. Centralization of expenditure powers of local self-governments is forecasted. The volume of
municipal budget own expenditures will decrease by 31-43% compared to the current level,
as well as the share of these expenditures in the total municipal budget expenditures, which
will decrease to 50 – 61% compared to the current 89%. At the same time, the share of
expenditure powers assigned by state authorities to local self-governments will increase to
39-49% of the total municipal budget expenditures, compared to the current level of 11%.
2. Certain increase, as well as certain decrease, of local budget independence with regard to
revenue powers is possible. There will be increase in “local budget own revenues”, which
according to the draft law comprise all tax and non-tax revenues and subsidies for budget
equalization. Likewise, there will be an increase in non-repayable transfers, except
subventions for performance of state powers (taking into account the elimination of
regulated taxes). The share of “own revenues” in municipal budget total revenues will
increase from 25% to 48 – 59%. At the same time, the share of subventions for performance
of state powers, spending that will be strictly regulated, will increase from 9% of total
revenues to 40-51%.
The new definition of “municipal budget own revenues”, introduced by the draft law, cannot
be used for evaluation of the increase in fiscal autonomy of local budgets, as it includes all
non-repayable transfers from budgets of the upper levels. For this purpose, the “municipal
budget own tax and non-tax revenues” indicator can be used to a certain extent.
Municipal budget own tax and non-tax revenue sources will expand somewhat from 29% to
32-36%. However, they may decrease to 24% if political efforts fail to either reduce state
expenditure powers for social benefits assigned to local self-governments, or to re-distribute
the revenues in favor of local budgets. Because the probability of this scenario is very high,
a decision to reduce the unfunded state obligations will play a key role in strengthening
fiscal autonomy of local budgets.
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3. Implementation of the draft law provisions on financing the state powers assigned to the
local level through subventions will strengthen the financial standing of local budgets.
However, it will be necessary to either re-distribute additional 80 billion rubles (in annual
terms) in favor of local budgets (i.e. increase local budgets by 11%), or to reduce the
volume of state powers, or not to assign a part of state powers to the local level. Otherwise,
as previously noted, this may result in reduction of local budget expenditures for addressing
the local issues stipulated by the draft law.
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